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CHARGES TO BE DECLINED: LEGAL 
CHALLENGES AND POLICY DEBATES 
SURROUNDING NON-PROSECUTION 
INITIATIVES IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Abstract: The election of “progressive prosecutors” introduces new objectives 
and tools into the traditional “tough on crime” playbook of local prosecution. 
Newly-elected District Attorney Rachael Rollins of Suffolk County, Massachu-
setts has proposed one such tool: non-prosecution of certain criminal laws, chief-
ly non-violent misdemeanors. This Note explores the likelihood of success of le-
gal challenges to categorical non-prosecution, primarily whether non-prosecution 
unconstitutionally violates the separation of powers. This Note considers whether 
non-prosecution implicates the rights of victims and notions of justice as a public 
or private domain. It also analyzes the merits of non-prosecution as a policy. 
Some critics challenge the ability of progressive prosecutors to change the crimi-
nal justice system from the inside, while others claim that non-prosecution of so-
called quality-of-life crimes damages communities rather than enriching them. 
Alternatively, those supportive of reform herald non-prosecution as a means of 
allowing local communities to influence the conduct of law enforcement, arguing 
that petty crime reflects public health failures that should be resolved by social 
services instead of jail-time. As novel as it is controversial, the proposed non-
prosecution policy deserves close attention from legal scholars and criminal re-
form advocates. 
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal justice activism in the past few years has shifted from public 
protests to internal reform.1 Voters in local district attorney (DA) elections in 
many urban jurisdictions across the country reward the candidate advocating 
for less incarceration, upending the traditional platform of a tough-on-crime 
prosecutor.2 In Massachusetts, the election of Rachael Rollins as District At-
torney of Suffolk County demonstrated popular support for her proposed poli-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Paige St. John & Abbie Vansickle, Here’s Why George Soros, Liberal Groups Are Spend-
ing Big to Help Decide Who’s Your Next D.A., L.A. TIMES (May 23, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.
latimes.com/local/california/la-me-prosecutor-campaign-20180523-story.html [https://perma.cc/DRG3-
YH67] (describing the grassroots support of liberal district attorney campaigns by groups such as 
Black Lives Matter). 
 2 See David Weigel, Down the Ballot, Liberal Reformers Take Over the Criminal Justice System, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/05/down-ballot-liberal-
reformers-take-over-criminal-justice-system/?utm_term=.55002b60f04d [https://perma.cc/9659-YW54] 
(identifying recent victories for progressive prosecutors in Chicago, Philadelphia, San Antonio, and 
St. Louis). 
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cy of non-prosecution of certain criminal misdemeanors that constitute petty 
crime.3 The proposed policy attracted significant local and national attention4, 
including a complaint to the Massachusetts Bar Association from the National 
Police Association.5 On March 25, 2019, the Suffolk County District Attor-
ney’s Office (SCDAO) released a sixty-six page memo (the Rollins Memo) 
that, in part, outlined the purpose and particulars of the policy.6 The Gover-
nor’s Office responded to the formal memo with a missive from the Massachu-
setts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security.7 Several months follow-
ing implementation of the policy, a Boston Municipal Court judge refused to 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Charges to Be Declined, RACHAEL ROLLINS FOR SUFFOLK DA, https://rollins4da.com/
policy/charges-to-be-declined/ [https://perma.cc/SNW9-64G9] (identifying fifteen crimes that Rollins’ 
office would not prosecute as a default policy). The crimes identified for non-prosecution are the 
following: trespassing; shoplifting (including similar conduct charged as larceny); larceny under $250; 
disorderly conduct; disturbing the peace; receiving stolen property; minor driving offenses (such as 
driving with a suspended license); breaking and entering (with conditions concerning vacancy, pur-
pose, and damage); wanton or malicious destruction of property; threats (excluding domestic vio-
lence); alcohol possession; drug possession (with or without intent to distribute); stand-alone resisting 
arrest charge; and resisting arrest in combination with other non-prosecution charges. Id. 
 4 See Taylor Pettaway, Incoming Top Prosecutor Rachael Rollins Firm but Flexible on ‘No-
Prosecute’ Offenses, BOS. HERALD (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.bostonherald.com/2018/11/29/
incoming-top-prosecutor-rachael-rollins-firm-but-flexible-on-no-prosecute-offenses/ [https://perma.
cc/PCB9-4YZZ] (demonstrating Boston-area news coverage); Boston’s New Top Prosecutor to Be 
Sworn In, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 30, 2018, 11:08 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/massachusetts/articles/2018-12-30/bostons-new-top-prosecutor-to-be-sworn-in [https://perma.
cc/YL48-ZUHG] (demonstrating national news coverage). 
 5 See Press Release, National Police Association Files Bar Complaint Against District Attorney 
Elect Rachael Rollins, NAT’L POLICE ASS’N (Dec. 28, 2018), https://nationalpolice.org/national-
police-association-files-bar-complaint-against-district-attorney-elect-rachael-rollins/ [https://perma.
cc/6TXU-7NY6] (filing an ethics complaint with the Massachusetts Bar Association). 
 6 See generally SUFFOLK CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY, THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO (Mar. 
2019) hereinafter THE ROLLINS MEMO] detailing the non-prosecution policy among other policy initi-
atives). Although the Rollins Memo still provides for non-prosecution of the above-listed fifteen 
crimes, it has specially formalized the conditions and circumstances under which a prosecutor should 
engage in non-prosecution. See id. at C-1. Some charges will not be prosecuted unilaterally; for exam-
ple, there are “no identified exceptions” to the presumption of non-prosecution for a minor in posses-
sion of alcohol charge. See id. at C-7. Most of the charges, however, have various conditions affecting 
whether the presumption will be non-prosecution, prosecution, or some other consequence. See id. at 
C-1. For example, a charge of shoplifting garners the presumption of non-prosecution if the property 
is returned undamaged, the individual has “substance abuse issues,” “mental health issues,” and/or 
“the item was taken out of necessity” because of unemployment. Id. at C-3. If the item was not taken 
out of necessity and the individual is a repeat offender or the property was “unrecovered or damaged,” 
the prosecutor can pursue a pre-arraignment restitution agreement. Id. Regardless of the state of the 
property, if the individual is in poverty, or has substance or mental health issues, the prosecutor will 
consult with a social worker to match the offender with a pre-arraignment diversion program. Id. 
 7 See Joe Dwinell, Charlie Baker’s Team Slams Rachael Rollins’ No-Prosecute List, BOS. HERALD 
(Apr. 5, 2019, 9:15 AM), https://www.bostonherald.com/2019/04/04/baker-team-slams-da-rachael-
rollins-no-prosecute-list-new-memo/ [https://perma.cc/896A-2PR7] (reporting that the Massachusetts 
department issued a letter to Rollins raising concerns that non-prosecution will hinder state opioid 
prevention efforts, hurt small-business operators, and jeopardize efforts to replace illicit marijuana 
markets with state-sanctioned markets). 
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allow non-prosecution of disorderly conduct charges levied against protesters, 
drawing rebuke from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).8 
The non-prosecution policy will affect a large amount of currently-
charged conduct.9 The Rollins Memo states that seventeen of the twenty-five 
charges most frequently filed by the SCDAO, making up thirty-two percent of 
the criminal charges filed, were nonviolent crimes involving driving, drugs, 
and real property.10 Although precise figures are not readily available, esti-
mates calculated using state and federal law enforcement data suggest that be-
tween 3987 and 5387 misdemeanor arrests occurred in Suffolk County in 2016 
would not have been prosecuted under a comparable non-prosecution policy.11 
Not only does the non-prosecution policy affect a large amount of conduct, it 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Alyssa Vaughn, Mass. Supreme Court Rules in Rachael Rollins’ Favor in Straight Pride 
Protest Dispute, BOS. MAG. (Sept. 9, 2019, 1:26 AM), https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2019/
09/09/rollins-straight-pride-supreme-court-ruling/ [https://perma.cc/TFG4-6L3V] (describing the 
course of events leading to success for Rollins’ policy). During an August 31, 2019 “Straight Pride 
Parade,” police officers arrested protesters for disorderly conduct. Id. At arraignment, Boston Munici-
pal Court Judge Richard Sinnott denied the assistant district attorney’s recommendation of non-
prosecution. Id. Rollins’ office filed an emergency petition appealing the decision, and Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) Associate Justice Frank Gaziano found that the judge acted without 
authority and ordered the protesters’ records expunged of the charges. Id.  
 9 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2015) 
(outlining the scope of misdemeanor prosecutions in the United States). 
 10 THE ROLLINS MEMO, supra note 6, at 4–5. The Rollins Memo states that these figures reflect 
“preliminary scans” of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office (SCDAO) charging data since 
2013 and that conclusions drawn from said data are tentative, pending completion of a data audit the 
SCDAO claims to be conducting. Id. at 4–5, 42. 
 11 See id. at 4–5, 42 (noting the absence of completed data analysis). Massachusetts law enforce-
ment made 23,766 arrests in 2016 for offenses like those DA Rollins does not intend to prosecute. 
FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS tbl.22 (2016), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-
the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-22 [https://perma.cc/WX3D-FEVX]. The Uniform 
Crime Reporting includes general categories, namely stolen property (buying, receiving, possessing), 
vandalism, drug abuse offenses, liquor laws (under 18), drunkenness, and disorderly conduct, which 
overlap with several offenses DA Rollins intends not to prosecute, namely disorderly conduct, wanton 
or malicious destruction of property, minor in possession of alcohol, drug possession, and drug pos-
session with intent to distribute. Id.; Charges to Be Declined, supra note 3. Although the FBI releases 
data for both arrests and prosecution of serious “Part I” offenses, such as murder, rape, burglary, etc., 
it only releases data for the arrests of less-serious “Part II” offenses, such as prostitution and vandal-
ism. Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 731, 
742–44 (2018). Within Massachusetts, Suffolk County accounted for 22.71% of violent crime and 
16.78% of property crime offenses known to law enforcement in 2016. See FBI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, supra at tbl.6 (identifying criminal offenses known to law enforce-
ment in Massachusetts municipalities). In Suffolk County, which includes the municipalities of Bos-
ton, Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop, there were 5,474 violent offenses out of a state total of 24,103, 
and 16,698 property offenses out of a state total of 99,497. Id. Applying those rates to the total arrests 
for misdemeanors suggests that between 3,987 and 5,387 misdemeanor arrests occurred in Suffolk 
County in 2016 that would not have been prosecuted under a comparable non-prosecution policy. See 
id. (multiplying the percentage of violent and property offenses that took place in Suffolk County 
municipalities by the total Massachusetts misdemeanor arrests that are substantially like the non-
prosecution offenses). 
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also creates a formal procedure of punishment quite distinct from the punish-
ment procedures identified by the relevant statute.12 
Although the misdemeanor system is vast and results in millions of annu-
al criminal charges, scholars suggest that misdemeanor charging rates peaked 
in the 1990s and are presently falling.13 A shrinking misdemeanor system 
could reflect public disapproval of prosecution and imprisonment for conduct 
perceived to result from public health failures rather than criminal intent.14 
Rollins’ stated purpose for the non-prosecution policy mirrors the perception 
that petty crime should be fought with tools other than imprisonment.15 Rollins 
characterizes the non-prosecuted crimes as non-violent and relating to quality-
of-life, justifying why these crimes can be enforced with measures other than 
jail time.16 Under the policy, prosecutors should either dismiss cases or down-
grade them to civil infractions with a penalty of community service, restitution, 
or free community programming, such as job training.17 
Although prosecutorial discretion is incredibly broad during charging de-
cisions, there are potential legal challenges to the non-prosecution policy.18 
Some scholars argue that non-enforcement of law qualifies as a separation of 
powers violation, but the most viable claims are under Massachusetts common 
law and catch-all provisions of Massachusetts ethics rules.19 These legal chan-
                                                                                                                           
 12 Compare, e.g., THE ROLLINS MEMO, supra note 6, at C-3 (specifying the various individual 
and property-specific conditions under which penalties of non-prosecution, diversion, or restitution 
could occur for the charge of shoplifting under Massachusetts law), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, 
§ 30A (2018) (setting out a progressive punishment scheme for shoplifting, in which the first violation 
allows a fine of under $250, the second violation allows a fine between $100 and $500, and the third 
violation allows a fine of under $500 and/or imprisonment in jail for under two years). 
 13 See Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 11, at 765–69, 775 app. B (estimating misdemeanor ar-
rest rates by state since 1985). 
 14 See Natapoff, supra note 9, at 1058 (showing that legislatures are recently trending toward 
decriminalization of particular misdemeanors); John F. Pfaff, Boston’s New D.A. Pushes Back Against 
Prosecutors’ ‘Punishment-Centric’ Point of View, THE APPEAL (Nov. 14, 2018), https://theappeal.
org/bostons-new-da-pushes-back-against-the-punishment-centric-point-of-view-of-prosecutors/ [https://
perma.cc/K3KN-UVDL] (identifying research supporting public health initiatives as an alternative to 
incarceration). 
 15 See ‘Jail as a Last Resort’: Rachael Rollins Defends Plan Not to Prosecute Certain Crimes, 
WGBH NEWS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.wgbh.org/news/local-news/2019/01/03/new-suffolk-da-
rachael-rollins-on-walking-the-talk-of-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/9ZTZ-Y45H] (stating 
that people can be held accountable for committing quality-of-life crimes without sending them to 
jail).  
 16 Id. 
 17 See Charges to Be Declined, supra note 3 (identifying the potential consequences for an indi-
vidual arrested for committing one of the petty crimes). 
 18 See, e.g., NAT’L POLICE ASS’N, IN RE: FORMAL COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR INVESTIGA-
TION OF ALLEGED ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT BY SUFFOLK COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY-ELECT, MS. 
RACHAEL ROLLINS 1–2 (Dec. 23, 2018) (urging the Office of Bar Counsel of the Massachusetts Bar 
Association to pre-emptively find the non-prosecution policy in violation of ethics rules). 
 19 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (allowing sanction 
for miscarriage of justice); Att’y Gen. v. Pelletier, 134 N.E. 407, 434, 438 (Mass. 1922) (dismissing a 
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nels operate as judicial stopgaps against institutional failure and will only be 
successful if Rollins’ policy results in a substantial public backlash, due to 
concerns about judicial overreach.20 
This Note continues in three parts.21 Part I of this Note outlines the possi-
ble legal challenges to Rollins’ non-prosecution policy under Massachusetts 
and federal law.22 Part II describes the academic scholarship that applies to 
non-prosecution of petty crime as a policy matter.23 Part III analyzes the merits 
of potential legal challenges and policy scholarship in the context of Rollins’ 
non-prosecution policy, arguing that the success of a legal challenge funda-
mentally depends on public opinion and the immediate effectiveness of im-
prisonment alternatives.24 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Rollins’ non-prosecution policy has already drawn a formal complaint and 
request for the Massachusetts Bar Association to investigate the policy as an 
ethical violation.25 Section A of this Part considers the constitutional challeng-
es available to the non-prosecution policy, namely, whether or not it is an un-
constitutional violation of separation of powers.26 Section B of this Part exam-
ines the policy in the context of victim rights requirements.27 Section C of this 
Part analyzes whether the policy would violate ethics rules.28 
                                                                                                                           
prosecutor for failing to prosecute particular crimes, among other offenses); Robert J. Delahunty & 
John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the 
DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (arguing that the Take Care 
Clause requires the President to “enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations 
and cases”). 
 20 See Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Mass. 1993) (holding that a judge who 
orders pre-trial dismissal of a case over the prosecutor’s objection claims executive powers in viola-
tion of separation of powers doctrine); THE ROLLINS MEMO, supra note 6, at app. C (outlining a non-
prosecution policy for fifteen low-level criminal offenses and misdemeanors). 
 21 See infra notes 25–278 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 25–143 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 144–228 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 229–278 and accompanying text. 
 25 See NAT’L POLICE ASS’N, supra note 18, at 1–2 (urging the Office of Bar Counsel of the Mas-
sachusetts Bar Association to pre-emptively find the non-prosecution policy in violation of ethics 
rules). 
 26 See infra notes 29–106 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 107–124 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 125–143 and accompanying text. 
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A. Separation of Powers 
Deciding not to prosecute violations of particular criminal statutes could 
prompt a constitutional challenge for violating separation of powers doctrine.29 
The basic argument would be that non-prosecution is functionally equivalent to 
the repeal of a law.30 Although a separation of powers challenge against a dis-
trict attorney would implicate Massachusetts law, the expansive federal schol-
arship and case law offers a broader scope of comparative analysis.31 Under 
federal law, prosecutors are agents of the executive branch, and the Constitu-
tion only grants the legislative branch the power to repeal a law.32 Although the 
U.S. Constitution lacks an express separation of powers clause, the doctrine is 
implicitly located in the document’s vesting of unique powers to the distinct 
branches of government.33 The Massachusetts State Constitution, however, 
provides express separation of powers requirements in Articles XX and 
XXX.34 This Section examines the separation of powers doctrine under both 
constitutions in order to help illustrate the particularities of constitutional chal-
lenges to non-prosecution.35 
1. Separation of Powers and the U.S. Constitution. 
Separation of powers was an important theoretical principle present at the 
Constitutional Convention, as illustrated in the tripartite division of govern-
ment and system of checks and balances of power among the three branches 
adopted at the Convention.36 Constitutional challenges to the conduct of one 
branch, on the basis of actions that usurp the authority of another branch, are 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Rachel Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1034–53 (2006) (discussing the enforcement of separation of powers in criminal law). 
 30 Id. at 1044–50. 
 31 See id. at 993 (noting the predominance of federal law, specifically in the administrative law 
and regulatory space, in separation of powers scholarship). 
 32 Id. 
 33 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting legislative power in the Congress); id. art. II, § 1 (vesting 
executive power in the President); id. art. III, § 1 (vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court and 
courts created by Congress). Use of the word “vested” denotes that the various powers are absolutely 
granted to the respective branch and cannot be usurped by another branch. Vested, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 34 MASS. CONST. art. XX, XXX. 
 35 See infra notes 36–106 and accompanying text. 
 36 See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separations of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 1253, 1259–60 (1988) (arguing that the inherently restrictive function of interdependent branch-
es of government reflected the Founders’ goal of promoting individual liberty and accountability). 
Most commonly associated with the writings of Montesquieu, separation of powers intends to prevent 
the concentration of power in an individual entity or body to such an extent that a tyrant could gain 
and retain power. Id. at 1254, 1259–60. Among the Founders, James Madison contributed the most to 
separation of powers theory. Id. at 1260. 
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the source of landmark Supreme Court cases.37 In recent decades, there has 
been an increase in cases involving separation of powers issues.38 The crux of 
separation of powers cases is the self-aggrandizement of one branch over an-
other.39 
Constitutional challenges to government conduct on the basis of inaction, 
however, are less common.40 A growing body of scholarship recognizes gov-
ernment inaction as a functional method of policy-making.41 This recognition 
is visible in strident academic opposition to the decision in Heckler v. Chaney 
in 1985.42 In Chaney, the Supreme Court found that an agency decision to not 
bring an enforcement action is presumed to be unreviewable unless the agency 
is committed to enforcement procedures by statute or the agency adopts a poli-
cy that abandons statutory responsibilities.43 Many administrative law scholars 
vehemently objected to the formalist approach, arguing that agency action and 
inaction can result in functionally equivalent policy.44 An academic disconnect, 
however, remains between functionalist understanding of government inaction 
and constitutional separation of power concerns.45 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585–86 (1952) (finding that 
President Truman’s seizure of steel production facilities in advance of a union strike was unconstitu-
tional in the absence of an authorizing statute); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167–68 
(1803) (turning on President Thomas Jefferson’s refusal to grant a commission approved by Con-
gress).  
 38 See Krent, supra note 36, at 1253–54 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 
(1986)) (arguing that separation of powers cases increased following congressional efforts to reign in 
delegations to the executive branch and executive responses to those efforts). 
 39 Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 
MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1206 (2014) (citing BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 59 (1967)). For example, Clinton v. City of New York found the line item 
veto unconstitutional as it allowed “‘the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes,’” which is 
the province of the Congress. Love & Garg, supra, at 1206 (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 
U.S. 417, 438 (1998) (emphasis added)). 
 40 See id. at 1207–08 (noting that Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence addresses the “acts” of a 
president rather than the choice not to act). 
 41 See id. at 1209–10 (summarizing academic research on nonaction as a means of executive 
discretion). 
 42 See id. at 1210 n.65 (noting prominent administrative law scholars who call for judicial review 
of agency inaction under the APA); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 43 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828, 832–33 n.4. The government body was an administrative agency, the 
Food and Drug Administration, which decided not to take enforcement actions against states that 
planned to use drugs for lethal injections that had not been specifically approved for such a purpose. 
Id. at 821. 
 44 See Love & Garg, supra note 39, at 1205–06, 1210 (noting that administrative inaction is more 
attractive from a policy perspective due to low administrative costs). 
 45 Id. It is noted, however, that some scholars are beginning to evaluate inaction as a constitution-
al violation. Id. at 1210–11 n.70; see, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 19, at 784 (suggesting that 
the Take Care Clause demands bright-line enforcement of all constitutional acts of Congress); Zacha-
ry S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 678–79 (2014) (pos-
iting a framework for enforcement discretion). 
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Scholars seeking to evaluate government action or inaction in the form of 
enforcement of the law through the separation of powers doctrine cite the Take 
Care Clause as the appropriate constitutional hook.46 The clause holds the 
President responsible for executing the law faithfully.47 When the definition of 
faithful execution is construed broadly, the executive gains considerable dis-
cretion in deciding how to enforce law.48 Scholars note that considerable en-
forcement discretion exists in the areas of administrative agencies and criminal 
prosecution.49 Rationales for this expansive allowance of discretionary en-
forcement include allocation of limited resources coupled with broad statutory 
and regulatory enforcement options, as well as the overabundance of viola-
tors.50 Furthermore, the judicial and legislative branches are typically willing 
participants in the expansive allowance of discretionary enforcement.51 
In criminal law, the executive carries out enforcement discretion primarily 
through prosecutorial charging discretion.52 Prosecutorial discretion covers a 
variety of possible conduct, including choosing between different charges 
(which themselves carry different penalties and sentencing consequences), nego-
tiating plea agreements through the removal of certain charges, and choosing not 
to bring charges altogether.53 Scholars argue that criminal law separation of 
powers cases have attracted less attention from courts and the legal academy 
than administrative law separation of power cases.54 This relative lack of atten-
tion to separation of powers in the context of criminal prosecution is counterin-
                                                                                                                           
 46 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Price, supra note 45, at 673. The Take Care Clause, which calls for 
faithful execution of the law, “evokes a notion of ‘faithful agency’” according to scholars, as opposed 
to enforcing law “without failure” or “exactly.” See Price, supra note 45, at 698 (arguing that the text 
of the Take Care Clause inherently allows for discretion). But see Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 19, at 
799–800 (arguing that the Take Care Clause is an instruction or command to the President that the 
laws are put into effect ‘without failure’ and ‘exactly’” (quoting Faithfully, 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A 
GENERAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 763 (1755))). 
 47 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (mandating that the President “shall take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed”). 
 48 See Price, supra note 45, at 683–85 (noting that “courts and executive-branch lawyers have 
come to see prosecutorial discretion as a central constitutional function of the executive branch”). 
 49 See id. at 681–82 (noting that federal criminal prosecution and administrative agency enforce-
ment actions are “shot through with discretion”). 
 50 Id. at 682. 
 51 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2311, 2357 (2006) (arguing that Congress can enact policy with broader scope and appeal by 
relying on the executive branch to effectively implement policy); Love & Garg, supra note 39, at 1229 
(noting that courts are “not well suited to review” the factors involved in enforcement decisions, such 
as likelihood of success and cost-benefit analysis). 
 52 Price, supra note 45, at 681. The expansion of federal criminal law in the last fifty years result-
ed in chargeable offenses for a range of conduct that cannot be realistically enforced to the full extent 
of the law. Id. (citing William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 517–19, 525 (2001)). 
 53 Id. at 681–82. 
 54 See Barkow, supra note 29, at 1010–11 (noting the “paucity of separation of powers cases 
generally and of criminal cases raising such issues in particular”). 
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tuitive because the Constitution expressly protects the rights of criminal de-
fendants, while administrative agencies rely on implicit constitutional protec-
tions identified by judicial interpretation.55 In spite of these express protec-
tions, criminal separation of powers cases are more receptive to functional rea-
soning that allows for greater executive discretion, while administrative sepa-
ration of powers cases more often employ restrictive formalist arguments.56 
Furthermore, federal criminal prosecution is only constrained by the Con-
stitution while modern administrative agencies, with their blend of legislative 
(rulemaking), executive (enforcement), and judicial (adjudication) powers, 
receive additional judicial supervision under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).57 As a result, criminal law receives scant bright-line protection relative 
to administrative law, and no statutory judicial oversight like that provided in 
the APA.58 
Further difference exists between enforcement discretion and executive 
nullification of law.59 There is a historical argument that, despite the absence of 
an express preclusion of executive nullification in the Constitution, the Found-
ers included the Take Care Clause to forbid nullification.60 Supreme Court 
precedent affirms the difference between discretion and nullification by means 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. at 1012. Barkow notes that the legislature is prohibited from passing ex post facto legisla-
tion or bills of attainder, which protect individuals from “trial by legislature.” Id. at 1013 (quoting 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965)). The judiciary is insulated through lifetime ap-
pointments and salary; additionally, all criminal trials must be jury trials. Id. at 1014–15; see U.S. 
CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. The executive power to grant pardon provides an additional check. U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2; Barkow, supra note 29, at 1016. 
 56 See Barkow, supra note 29, at 1010–11 (distinguishing between methods of argument in crimi-
nal and civil separation of powers cases). Barkow compares the functional approach used in major 
criminal cases with the formalist approach used in administrative civil cases. Id. (citing Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), as major criminal cases). 
 57 See id. at 1020–25 (noting the public record-keeping and hard-look judicial review require-
ments of the APA as means for restricting arbitrariness in agency discretionary policy-making and 
enforcement). 
 58 See id. at 1032–34 (noting the lack of oversight for criminal prosecution relative to administra-
tive enforcement). Alternatively, administrative agencies dominate their regulatory spheres while the 
states hold the clear majority of criminal jurisdictions. Id. at 1019 & n.166 (noting that less than seven 
percent of felony convictions occurred in federal court in 2000 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS—2002, at 421 
tbl.5.22, 477 tbl.5.44)). This distinction diminishes the urgency of separation of powers protections 
against federal criminal law enforcement relative to administrative regulations. Id. at 1019. 
 59 See Price, supra note 45, at 689–97 (defining executive nullification as contrary to the constitu-
tional principal that the Congress wields legislative supremacy). 
 60 Id. Critical to the struggle for independence was American colonial opposition to the authority 
of the English monarch to suspend existing laws and issue dispensations exempting individual com-
pliance. See id. at 692 (noting that several early state constitutions forbid suspension and exemption 
powers). During the Constitutional Convention, an express anti-nullification provision was removed 
by the Committee on Detail. Id. at 693 & n.75 (citing Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Pres-
ident and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65–66 (1994)). Scholarship suggests that the 
Founders considered such a provision to be clearly implicit in the Take Care Clause. Id. at 694. 
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of the executive forbidding enforcement.61 Scholars argue that the interaction 
of constitutional provisions, particularly the Take Care Clause, actually sup-
ports enforcement discretion by the executive.62 The Supreme Court extends 
allowance of enforcement discretion to criminal law as well.63 
The amount of executive enforcement discretion that is allowable is sub-
ject to debate.64 Historically, there was less enforcement discretion available in 
the early Republic than in modern times, providing evidence of constitutional 
support through proximity to the Founding.65 The expansion of the federal 
government in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries built the foundation 
for the expanded use of executive enforcement discretion.66 Furthermore, 
much of the expansion occurred alongside new statutes increasingly regulating 
and subjecting criminal sanctions on activities outside the reach of common 
law crimes.67 These statutes expanded the reach of government power to a 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See Kendall v. United States ex. rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612–13 (1838) (finding the 
President violated separation of powers by refusing to carry out an act of Congress that included a 
direct order and in effect nullified the law). 
 62 See Price, supra note 45, at 696–700 (arguing that the text of the Take Care Clause, allowing 
for “faithful” execution of the law, inherently allows for discretion). Scholars also argue that the Par-
don Clause and the preclusion of Bills of Attainder provide constitutional support for executive en-
forcement discretion. See id. (noting that the Pardon Clause, in both historical and modern understand-
ing, allows for the President to bar punishment for any completed criminal offense, thereby allowing 
the executive to limit the enforcement of the law). 
 63 See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
717, 747–48 (1996) (noting that in United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979), the 
Supreme Court upheld government discretion in choosing among different criminal statutes when 
prosecuting the underlying conduct, so long as the government does not discriminate against any class 
of defendants). 
 64 Compare Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 19, at 784 (arguing that the Take Care Clause effec-
tively precludes executive enforcement discretion), with Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2332–37 (2001) (arguing in support of a strong unitary executive through, 
among other strategies, increasing presidential influence over administrative agency enforcement 
decisions to advance policy objectives). 
 65 See Price, supra note 45, at 717 n.191 (providing an overview of judicial and scholarly support 
for analyzing early American practices as indicative of constitutional meaning). 
 66 Id. at 743–46. Price identifies “population growth, immigration, urbanization,” as well as an 
increase in statutory offenses, as causal factors contributing to the increase in criminal conduct. Id. at 
743. The failure of the government to respond in kind with enforcement resources increased discre-
tionary non-prosecution as a practical matter. See id. at 743–44 (discussing the rise of prosecutorial 
discretion in the nineteenth century, including the rise of plea bargaining). Price also notes the shift 
from case-based to salary-based compensation for federal prosecutors as the removal of an economic 
incentive “to convict as many people as possible.” Id. at 744–45 (quoting NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, 
AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE 276–77 (2013)). 
 67 Id. at 743–44. Price identifies such statutes as creating predominately “malum prohibitum” 
crimes, conduct criminalized by statute, as opposed to “malum in se” crimes, conduct prohibited by 
ordinary morality and expressed in common law crimes such as murder and theft. Id. at 743 & n.319. 
See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 257–67 (2011) 
(discussing the increasing size and scope of criminal law alongside growth of regulatory crimes). 
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larger range of conduct, while enforcement discretion allowed the executive to 
adjust the scope of that power relative to the intensity of societal opposition.68 
Congress, in turn, enacted statutes with broad prohibitions, relying on the 
executive to carry out a practicable enforcement regime.69 Some scholars argue 
that legislators delegated the ability to determine the scope of criminal law to 
prosecutors.70 Legislators intentionally write the statutory text of criminal law 
broadly to encompass a wide range of conduct, with the knowledge that prose-
cutors will use their discretion in determining when to prosecute a crime.71 
This argument proposes that a policy of non-prosecution against an entire cat-
egory of cases or charges is within the powers of enforcement discretion.72 
Such a policy is more transparent and consistent than case-by-case discretion, 
decreasing the potential for arbitrary enforcement.73 Furthermore, Congress 
can always express disapproval of non-prosecution by imposing a positive du-
ty of enforcement on the executive, which cannot be circumscribed under the 
guise of discretion.74 
The judiciary similarly defers to executive enforcement discretion, partic-
ularly in the context of criminal law.75 Charging, dismissing, and plea bargain-
ing decisions are largely at the discretion of the prosecutor.76 In 1996, in Unit-
ed States v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court affirmed that a prosecutor only re-
quires probable cause to make the discretionary charging decision.77 Although 
prosecutors may not base discretionary decisions on “race, religion, or another 
arbitrary classification,” the defendant holds the burden of showing that the 
government was discriminatory in its discretion.78 In civil enforcement, courts 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Price, supra note 45, at 743–44. 
 69 Id. at 745. 
 70 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Elected Prosecutors and Non-Prosecution Policies, PRAWFS
BLAWG (Sept. 8, 2018), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/09/elected-prosecutors-
and-non-prosecution-policies.html [https://perma.cc/PP6D-N5HK] (arguing that overly broad laws 
cannot be enforced without significant delegation of discretion as to charging decisions). 
 71 Id.; see Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 
YALE L.J. 458, 463, 511–14 (2009) (describing the reliance on discretion as “de facto delegation”); 
see also Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 995 (2019) 
(arguing that broad or imprecise criminal laws delegate the power to determine legal scope to prosecu-
tors instead of judges). 
 72 Hessick, supra note 70. 
 73 See id. (arguing that written policies provide a structure for holding law enforcement accounta-
ble). 
 74 Price, supra note 45, at 715 (citing United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274, 279–80 (1911) 
(affirming a statutory design imposing a duty on the district attorney to “prosecute without delay” 
once certain administratively determined conditions had been met)). 
 75 See id. at 683–84 (outlining the breadth of precedent upholding prosecutorial discretion). 
 76 Barkow, supra note 29, at 1025. 
 77 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357, 364 (1978)). 
 78 Id. at 463–64. Known as a selective prosecution claim, the defendant must provide clear evi-
dence that the government violated equal protection standards by failing to prosecute similarly situat-
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outlined another path for finding wrongful enforcement discretion.79 In 1973, 
in Adams v. Richardson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Circuit of 
the District of Columbia held that courts may enjoin an agency shown to have 
engaged in complete non-enforcement of a statute that Congress charged the 
agency to administer.80 The Supreme Court cited the action taken in Adams 
with approval in Cheney, but noted that judicial review is generally unsuitable 
for examining non-enforcement decisions.81 
With a lack of clear guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress, 
scholars suggest analytical tests to determine constitutional thresholds of dis-
cretion.82 Statutes could be analyzed through factors such as providing a base-
line of requisite enforcement, stating legitimate reasons for non-prosecution, 
and using policy goals to guide the discretion instead of circumstances unrelat-
ed to policy.83 
2. Separation of Powers and the Massachusetts Constitution 
Separation of powers in Massachusetts, despite its express inclusion in 
the state constitution, has been interpreted more flexibly during the last half-
century.84 Regardless of the shift in application, the Massachusetts SJC contin-
ues to recognize the core principle of Article XXX: that no branch of govern-
ment may interfere with the power of other branches.85 Furthermore, the SJC 
has occasionally recognized the express language of Article XX precluding 
non-legislative authorities from suspending the execution of laws.86 Separation 
                                                                                                                           
ed defendants. Id. at 465–66 (citing United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)). 
Prosecutorial conduct maintains a “presumption of regularity.” Id. at 464. In Armstrong, the court 
evaluated the merits of a selective prosecution claim based on past criminal charging statistics as op-
posed to criminal conduct statistics. See id. at 469 (arguing that criminal conduct statistics show high-
er rates of sentencing for particular crimes among different races). 
 79 See Price, supra note 45, at 684 (distinguishing between criminal and civil enforcement discre-
tion). 
 80 Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1160–62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (up-
holding the district court order that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare commence 
enforcement proceedings against schools found to be noncompliant with Title VI). 
 81 Cheney, 470 U.S. at 831, 833 n.4 (contrasting the case before it with the “extreme” case of 
agency “abdication of statutory responsibilities”). 
 82 See Love & Garg, supra note 39, at 1212–20 (identifying important factors for determining the 
constitutionality of non-prosecution decisions). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Compare Ex parte Germain, 155 N.E. 12, 13 (Mass. 1927) (noting that Article XXX provides 
“strict separation of the powers of the executive and judicial departments of government”), with Gray 
v. Comm’r of Revenue, 665 N.E.2d 17, 21–22 (Mass. 1996) (admitting that overlap between the 
branches is acceptable). 
 85 See, e.g., Op. of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476, 478–80 (Mass. 1974) (striking down a data pro-
cessing commission for exerting powers held by the judiciary). 
 86 See, e.g., Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. Advisory Bd. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 417 N.E.2d 7, 13 
(Mass. 1981) (holding that the Governor could not suspend a law imposing conditions and limits on a 
state agency). 
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of powers challenges have been successfully raised even under the modern, 
flexible interpretation.87 
Prosecution in Massachusetts is enshrined in the constitutional, statutory, 
and common law as a right of governmental authority.88 The prosecutor is an 
agent of the executive branch and has a duty to recognize legal violations and 
bring enforcement proceedings.89 Prosecutors hold broad discretion in deter-
mining whether to bring a case.90 This includes the statutory discretion to bring 
charges and the discretion to drop pending charges, otherwise known as enter-
ing a nolle prosequi.91 Statutory resolution of a dispute surrounding the power 
to drop pending charges was affirmed on the basis of Article XXX, illustrating 
the viability of separation of powers violations.92 A judge may not enter a nolle 
prosequi in a case over the objection of the prosecuting attorney.93 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See, e.g., In re Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 717 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Mass. 1999) (finding a 
delegation of legislative appropriation power to the Governor to be unconstitutional). 
 88 See John P. Zanini & Jeremy Bucci, “The Interests of Public Justice” and the Judicial Deci-
sion to Terminate Prosecutions: Silencing the Voice of the People, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 163, 167–69 (2000) (collecting sources). Several articles of the Massachusetts Decla-
ration of Rights suggest that prosecution is a constitutional privilege of the government. See MASS. 
CONST. art. VII (holding that government exists for the common good and to provide safety and pro-
tection for Massachusetts residents); id. art. X (holding that every individual has right to protection 
under the standing laws); id. art. XI (holding that all Massachusetts residents have recourse to the laws 
and are not obliged to purchase the means of obtaining justice). Statutory right is found in the duty of 
the prosecutor to “take cognizance of all violations of law . . . affecting the general welfare of the 
people . . . [and] institute or cause to be instituted criminal or civil proceedings before the appropriate 
. . . [courts] . . . as he may deem to be for the public interest . . . .” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 10 
(2018). Scholars identify a common law right to prosecutorial discretion throughout Massachusetts 
precedent. See Zanini & Bucci, supra, at 164 n.3 (citing Massachusetts case law); see, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Franklin, 385 N.E.2d 227, 233 (Mass. 1978) (holding that prosecutors are law enforcement 
officers and “enjoy considerable discretion in exercising selectivity for purposes consistent with the 
public interest”); Att’y Gen. v. Tufts, 132 N.E. 322, 326 (Mass. 1921) (holding that the prosecutor 
carries the authority to decline to prosecute a complaint or indictment). 
 89 See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 574 N.E.2d 974, 977 (Mass. 1991) (finding that the district 
attorney is the elected advocate of the people and that judicial interference with prosecutorial deci-
sions usurps the authority of the executive branch); Commonwealth v. Tuck, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 356, 
364–66 (1838) (finding that the Attorney General carries the power to manage all prosecutions). 
 90 See Shepard v. Att’y Gen., 567 N.E.2d 187, 189–90 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a prosecutor 
that held an inquest into a death does not have a duty to bring a case); Manning v. Mun. Court of the 
Roxbury Dist., 361 N.E.2d 1274, 1276 (Mass. 1977) (holding that the prosecutor carries discretion to 
discontinue prosecution without approval of another official). 
 91 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 15 (noting the power of the district attorney to enter nolle 
prosequi, an order to drop pending charges); see Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d at 718–19 (holding that a 
judge who orders pre-trial dismissal of a case over the prosecutor’s objection claims executive powers 
in violation of Article XXX); Town of Burlington v. District Att’y for N. Dist., 412 N.E.2d 331, 334 
n.11 (Mass. 1980) (noting an exception for town counsel in district court prosecutions that charge 
under municipal by-laws). Nolle prosequi is a term of art referring to the abandonment of a lawsuit or 
prosecution. Nolle Prosequi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 92 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 18 (allowing juvenile defendants and defendants in Boston 
municipal court to issue a conditional continuance followed by dismissal of charges); Commonwealth 
v. Cheney, 800 N.E.2d 309, 314 (Mass. 2003) (finding that the procedure for judge-issued continu-
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Prosecutors also carry the power to grant immunity in Massachusetts, 
which is a means of enforcement discretion.94 The individual authority of a 
DA, however, is limited to her district.95 To receive immunity on a state-wide 
level or against prosecution for a federal crime, the prosecutor must take steps 
outside of their discretion.96 Prosecutors may also select among multiple sen-
tence enhancement statutes or multiple criminal charges when charging de-
fendants.97 
Outside of Article XXX, there is a history in the United States and Mas-
sachusetts to enforce prosecutions through judicial mandate.98 In Massachu-
setts, the case of Attorney General v. Pelletier, decided in 1922, provides prec-
edent for a court to remove a prosecutor on the basis of failure to enforce the 
law.99 In Pelletier, the Massachusetts SJC found that the prosecutor had 
knowledge of probable cause that criminal statutes were violated, yet refused 
to bring charges.100 The court detailed the various failures to enforce the law, 
and several instances involving conspiracy and extortion on the part of the 
prosecutor.101 The court also lamented ordinary criminal assaults where the 
prosecutor failed to bring charges without excuse or explanation.102 
                                                                                                                           
ance of a case, without first obtaining a guilty plea or a verdict and over the objection of the prosecu-
tor, constituted a constitutionally invalid exercise of executive powers under Article XXX). 
 93 See Commonwealth v. Vascovitch, 661 N.E.2d 117, 118–19 (Mass. App. 1996) (holding that a 
decision to nol pros cannot be entered over the prosecutor’s objection absent a legal basis). But see 
Commonwealth v. Borders, 900 N.E.2d 117, 119–20 (Mass. App. 2009) (noting the exceptions of 
“egregious prosecutorial misconduct” and “serious threat of prejudice” to the defendant). 
 94 See Baglioni v. Chief of Police of Salem, 656 N.E.2d 1223, 1224 n.4 (Mass. 1995) (distin-
guishing an accepted offer of immunity from reliance on an offer which was previously rejected). 
 95 Id. at 1225. 
 96 Id. State-wide grants of immunity require proper notice to other prosecutors, as required by 
statute, and assent by the Attorney General. Id. at 1225 n.6; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20E 
(defining the procedure for notice to other prosecutors which can lead to assented immunity). Recog-
nition of immunity from federal prosecution requires either grant of immunity from a federal prosecu-
tor or “use and derivative use” circumstances. Baglioni, 656 N.E.2d at 1225 n.7; see Kastigar v. Unit-
ed States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (holding that the Fifth Amendment protects witnesses who are 
compelled to offer self-incriminating testimony from prosecution). 
 97 See Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 84 N.E.3d 13, 20–21 (Mass. 2017) (finding that a judge’s deci-
sion not to sentence a defendant pursuant to statutes that were properly charged and convicted was 
error). 
 98 See Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy 
for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 143, 175 & n.178 (2016) (discussing state cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
that disciplined prosecutors for non-prosecution). 
 99 See Pelletier, 134 N.E. at 434–38 (sanctioning a district attorney on grounds including failure 
to prosecute). 
 100 Id. at 438. 
 101 See, e.g., id. at 434–38 (detailing the prosecutor’s involvement in a series of criminal enter-
prises). 
 102 See, e.g., id. at 434 (finding a district attorney guilty of failing to prosecute an assault and 
battery supported by witnesses and the victim). 
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Non-prosecution of criminal law in Massachusetts has not received sig-
nificant attention from modern courts or scholarship.103 When courts have con-
sidered non-enforcement of civil law, however, they have found executive en-
croachment on legislative powers in cases of executive refusal or failure to 
apply appropriated funds to be unconstitutional.104 Courts have found execu-
tive actions suspending the enforcement of civil laws to violate Article XX as 
well.105 Furthermore, courts have found that agents of the executive branch 
besides the Governor can unconstitutionally tread on legislative power.106 
B. Victim Rights and Restitution 
Massachusetts recognizes a statutory Victim Bill of Rights, which pro-
vides specific rights for the victims of crime and their families.107 Within the 
Victim Bill of Rights, various requirements turn on the precise moment in 
criminal proceedings.108 For example, an individual does not accrue any rights 
until a complaint or indictment is issued.109 Massachusetts is one of a minority 
of states that grant private citizens the right to file an application seeking crimi-
nal complaint and appear before a clerk-magistrate to demonstrate probable 
cause for arrest.110 If the clerk-magistrate finds there is probable cause, the DA 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See Zanini & Bucci, supra note 88, at 167–69 (discussing Massachusetts precedent and schol-
arship surrounding nolle prosequi rather than non-prosecution). 
 104 See Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Mass. 1978) (finding that alt-
hough the executive branch has discretion to avoid wasteful expenditures, refusal to issue appropriated 
funds that accomplish disliked objectives would violate Article XXX). 
 105 See Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. Advisory Bd., 417 N.E.2d at 13 (holding that the Governor could 
not suspend a law imposing conditions and limits on a state agency). It is noteworthy that judges 
commonly evaluate whether the legislature has appropriately delegated suspending power to the exec-
utive through the constitutional framework of Article XX. See Op. of the Justices, 52 N.E.2d 974, 975, 
978 (Mass. 1944) (finding that a state statute empowering the Governor to exercise authority over 
persons during emergency of war did not authorize the Governor to advance the date of state primary 
elections). 
 106 See, e.g., Curley v. City of Lynn, 556 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Mass. 1990) (finding that a state execu-
tive agency, the Civil Service Commission, cannot modify statutory provisions). 
 107 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3. See generally Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s 
Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 944–51 (1985) (identifying the growth of the victim’s rights movement 
with retributive theories of criminal punishment). 
 108 See Henderson, supra note 107, at 967–68 (noting that victim’s rights proposals can be broad-
ly categorized as concerning pre-conviction rights and rights at sentencing). For example, once a 
complaint or indictment has been issued, victims must be informed by the prosecutor of their “rights 
in the criminal process.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(a). 
 109 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 1 (defining the term “victim”). 
 110 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 4(b) (granting right to a private person to apply for issuance of pro-
cess); Victory Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 755 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 2001) 
(finding that private right to the criminal complaint process is limited to filing an application and court 
action on that application). 
2526 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:2511 
retains prosecution of the case; there are no private prosecutions in Massachu-
setts.111 
After issuance of a complaint or indictment, but prior to prosecution pro-
ceedings, victims receive rights that primarily relate to the provision of infor-
mation.112 After the prosecutor initiates proceedings, victims receive more sub-
stantial rights that can influence the prosecutor’s discretion to dismiss the case, 
namely the right to confer with the prosecutor prior to entry of nolle prosequi, 
to submit a victim impact statement, and to request restitution be part of the 
disposition.113 Victims also have the right to the return of personal property 
that was either stolen or taken for evidence once the property is no longer 
needed for law enforcement or prosecution purposes.114 
The statutory framework provides remedies for violation of the Victim 
Bill of Rights that courts will enforce, subject to limitations.115 The Victim Bill 
of Rights broadly calls on actors in the criminal justice system, including pros-
ecutors and judges, to assure the provision of victims’ rights.116 The law does 
not provide specific procedures for victims to challenge the criminal justice 
system, though it did create a Victim and Witness Assistance Board to help 
victims receive their rights.117 Victims do not have standing as a party in crim-
inal proceeding, even if their rights are denied, and they cannot demand inter-
locutory appeal due to denial of those rights.118 Courts have repeatedly urged 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See Taylor v. Newton Div. of Dist. Court Dep’t, 622 N.E.2d 261, 262 (Mass. 1993) (noting 
that a private citizen has no “judicially cognizable interest” in the prosecution of another individual); 
Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 146, 147 (1855) (prohibiting Massachusetts prosecutors 
from receiving compensation from individual persons). Some argue for the allowance of private pros-
ecution. See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Pri-
vate Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 424 (2009) (discussing appeals within the victim’s rights 
movement for expanded private initiation of criminal complaints and the potential conflicts of interest 
arising from private prosecution). 
 112 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(a) (requiring the prosecutor to inform victims of their 
“rights in the criminal process”); id. § 3(d) (requiring the victim to be informed of available protec-
tions); id. § 3(e) (requiring victim to be informed of financial assistance and social services); id. § 3(h) 
(requiring the victim to be informed that they may request confidentiality). 
 113 Id. § 3(n)–(p). 
 114 Id. § 3(r). 
 115 See, e.g., Hagen v. Commonwealth, 772 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Mass. 2002) (finding that a court is 
obligated to provide the victim opportunity to address the court when the right to a prompt disposition 
of the case is jeopardized). 
 116 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 12. 
 117 Id. § 4. The law does require that district attorneys create and maintain programs to facilitate 
the provision of victim’s rights, expressly mentioning court appearances, informational services, case 
notification, property return, protection, and social service referrals. Id. § 5. The programs themselves, 
however, are overseen by the district attorney and subject to resource availability. Id. 
 118 See In re McDonough, 930 N.E.2d 1279, 1285–87 (Mass. 2010) (refusing to use the SJC’s 
power of discretionary review to grant standing for an interlocutory appeal filed by the victim as a 
prospective witness (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3)); Hagen, 772 N.E.2d at 34 (finding that a 
victim lacks standing to file a motion to revoke a post-conviction stay of criminal sentence on the 
ground of a victim’s rights violation). 
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judges and prosecutors to ensure compliance with victims’ rights provisions 
outside of a formal legal process.119 
Distinct from the constitutional rights granted to victims of crime in Mas-
sachusetts is the common law practice of restitution.120 Restitution in criminal 
law refers to the court-enforced practice of making whole, typically through 
monetary compensation, the individual victim of a crime for financial losses 
suffered as a consequence of the criminal conduct.121 Both the Victim Bill of 
Rights and common law provide for restitution.122 Although restitution is al-
lowable where a crime victim suffers financial injury, it is similarly subject to 
the discretion of the prosecutor.123 Further, in 2016, in Commonwealth v. Hen-
ry, the Massachusetts SJC held that a judge must consider the defendant’s abil-
ity to pay when determining restitution.124 
C. Ethics Violations 
Prosecutors must abide by the attorney ethical standards of their jurisdic-
tion, presenting an additional avenue for legal challenge to discretionary non-
prosecution.125 The National Police Association already raised such a chal-
lenge.126 In their complaint to the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers and 
Office of the Bar Counsel, the National Police Association alleged that Rollins’ 
non-prosecution policy constituted a violation of several ethical standards.127 
                                                                                                                           
 119 See, e.g., Hagen, 772 N.E.2d at 37–38 (holding that courts should give victims an opportunity 
to address the court directly when their “fundamental right” is jeopardized). 
 120 See Cristina Rodrigues, The Cost of Justice: The Importance of a Criminal Defendant’s Ability 
to Pay in the Era of Commonwealth v. Henry, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 204, 211 (2018) (describing the 
practice of restitution generally and in Massachusetts). 
 121 See id. (noting that restitution seeks to return the victim to the approximate position held be-
fore the crime occurred). 
 122 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(o); see Rodrigues, supra note 120, at 211 (“Victim compen-
sation has been recognized by Massachusetts courts since as early as 1834.”). 
 123 See Rodrigues, supra note 120, at 211–13 (describing the state monopoly on prosecution and 
focus on punishment rather than compensation). Furthermore, in cases where victims have exercised 
undue influence in determining the amount of restitution sought during plea negotiations, courts have 
sanctioned the prosecutor for violating ethical rules. See, e.g., In re Flatt-Moore, 959 N.E.2d 241, 245 
(Ind. 2012) (sanctioning a prosecutor for allowing the victim to dictate the amount of restitution in-
cluded in a plea bargain). In Flatt-Moore, the court held that its sanction of the prosecutor did not 
violate separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 246. 
 124 See Commonwealth v. Henry, 55 N.E.3d 943, 950 (Mass. 2016) (noting that because a judge 
may condition probation on payment of restitution, the restitution is enforced by threat of criminal 
sanction). The court noted that a victim should be notified of their right to civil action independent of 
a criminal restitution order. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(u)). 
 125 See Green & Levine, supra note 98, at 149–53 (outlining the ethics rules bearing on prosecu-
torial conduct). 
 126 See NAT’L POLICE ASS’N, supra note 18, at 1 (filing an ethics complaint before Rollins even 
took office). 
 127 Id. The complaint identifies provisions concerning prosecutor responsibilities in the Massa-
chusetts Rules of Professional Conduct and the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
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Although the Supreme Court, in Connick v. Thompson in 2011, highlighted 
disciplinary challenges as a tool for confronting prosecutorial misconduct, 
scholars dispute their effectiveness.128 Similar to the deference shown toward 
prosecutorial discretion, federal prosecutors infrequently receive disciplinary 
sanction from federal courts.129 Some state disciplinary boards and state courts 
are relatively less deferential.130 Particular ethical rules written exclusively for 
prosecutors, however, are often diluted when adopted by state disciplinary au-
thorities.131 
There are few ethical standards applicable to a legal challenge of Rollins’ 
non-prosecution policy.132 For example, the standards identified in the National 
Police Association complaint include both enforceable rules and non-
enforceable guidance.133 Most clearly applicable is Rule 3.8 of the Massachu-
setts Rules of Professional Conduct, directed exclusively at prosecutors.134 
Rule 3.8(a) is the only provision regulating charging decisions and repeats the 
constitutional requirement that the prosecutor must hold probable cause for the 
charge.135 Although a minimum evidentiary threshold restricts the prosecutor’s 
ability to bring charges, it does not impose an affirmative charging requirement 
when the threshold is met.136 Scholars identify additional ethics rules that 
                                                                                                                           
Justice. Id. (citing MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(f)(1) (2016); CRIMINAL JUSTICE STAND-
ARDS §§ 3-1.2(b), 3-1.3, 3-1.4, 3-1.6, 3-1.7(f) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015)). 
 128 563 U.S. 51, 65–70 (2011); see David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability 
After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect 
Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 220 (2011), https://www.yalelaw
journal.org/pdf/1018_hpkwev93.pdf (citing studies demonstrating that disciplinary reviews, as they 
are currently conducted, do not effectively enforce prosecutor accountability). 
 129 See Green & Levine, supra note 98, at 144–45 (noting that prosecutors are “rarely disciplined” 
and that observers feel the punishments that are imposed are often too light). 
 130 See id. at 169–70 (noting that some state courts recognize authority to review aspects of charg-
ing decisions). 
 131 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (enumerating the 
specific responsibilities of a prosecutor); Keenan supra note 128, at 227–30 (discussing the common 
modifications to Model Rule 3.8 as adopted by state disciplinary authorities).  
 132 See Green & Levine, supra note 98, at 151 (distinguishing the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct from the non-enforceable guidelines for prosecutor ethics laid out in the ABA Crimi-
nal Justice Standards). 
 133 See NAT’L POLICE ASS’N, supra note 18 at 3–6. 
 134 MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8. The American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct originally drafted the language of Rule 3.8, which was adopted by the Massa-
chusetts legislature. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8, with MASS. RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8. 
 135 See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1588 (citing 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972)) (noting that both the law and the Model Rules forbid 
prosecution of a charge the “prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause”). 
 136 See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (using the operative verb “refrain” to define 
when a prosecutor may bring charges as opposed to an affirmative requirement). 
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could apply, including conflict of interest and prejudice to justice provisions.137 
Conflict of interest rules apply where the charging decision is motivated by 
desire to improve a third party’s interest or advance the prosecutor’s self-
interest, political or otherwise.138 Rule 8.4(d), the prejudice to justice rule, is a 
catch-all provision invoked by authorities against abuses of prosecutorial dis-
cretion that involve gross misconduct.139 
Other Rules of Professional Responsibility may apply to the manner in 
which Rollins announced the non-prosecution policy.140 Rule 3.8(f) restricts 
prosecutors from making extrajudicial comments that violate Rule 3.6, which 
prohibits attorneys from making comments that have a “substantial likelihood” 
of materially influencing a matter.141 Also, Rule 8.4(c) restricts conduct involv-
ing “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”142 These standards could 
be invoked if individuals relied on Rollins’ announcement to carry out the 
identified conduct and were subsequently prosecuted.143 
II. NON-PROSECUTION AS POLICY: TOO FAR OR NOT FAR ENOUGH? 
As a normative matter, Rollins’ non-prosecution policy offers insight into 
both criminal justice reform and the effect of prosecutorial discretion on the 
rule of law.144 Section A first sketches the degree to which advocates of various 
criminal justice reforms support, and challenge, non-prosecution.145 Section B 
then describes the ways in which non-prosecution interacts with theoretical 
and practical understandings of the rule of law.146 
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Green & Levine, supra note 98 at 154 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, 
1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 8.4(d)). 
 138 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (concerning current clients); id. r. 1.9 (con-
cerning former clients); id. r. 1.11 (concerning former and current government employees); see, e.g., 
In re Discipline of Bonet, 29 P.3d 1242, 1245, 1249 (Wash. 2001) (disciplining prosecutor for offer-
ing to dismiss criminal charges in exchange for the defendant agreeing not to testify at the trial of his 
coconspirator). 
 139 MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d); see, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary 
Bd. v. Barry, 762 N.W.2d 129, 134, 140 (Iowa 2009) (suspending prosecutor for quid pro quo contri-
butions to a sheriff’s fund in exchange for non-prosecution). 
 140 See, e.g., MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (concerning trial publicity), 8.4(c) (con-
cerning misconduct involving misrepresentation).  
 141 Id. r. 3.6(a), 3.8(f). R. Michael Cassidy argues that the restrictions on political speech enacted 
by these rules have lost their strength and policy platforms issued by a political candidate for district 
attorney invoke First Amendment protections. R. Michael Cassidy, The Prosecutor and the Press: 
Lessons (Not) Learned from the Mike Nifong Debacle, 71 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 75–79 (2008). 
 142 MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c). 
 143 Id. r. 3.6(a), 8.4(c). See generally Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 937, 1015–20 (2017) (discussing the viability of a common law defense based on a 
promissory estoppel theory following a pattern or policy of executive non-enforcement). 
 144 See infra notes 147–228 and accompanying text. 
 145 See infra notes 147–200 and accompanying text. 
 146 See infra notes 201–228 and accompanying text. 
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A. Perspectives in Criminal Justice Reform 
Non-prosecution is, in part, analyzed within a vast field of academic 
scholarship surrounding the policy implications of criminal justice reform, 
from focus on quality-of-life crime to the merits of diversion.147 Rollins’ policy 
has already drawn challenge and support from legal scholars and officials.148 
This Section provides an overview of the policy arguments used to both sup-
port and oppose prosecutors’ use of non-prosecution.149 First, it discusses the 
policy arguments of non-prosecution opponents.150 It then outlines policy fa-
vored by the proponents.151 
1. Challenges 
The policy of non-prosecution has been challenged on two principal 
grounds.152 First, this subsection outlines the argument of scholars who chal-
lenge that non-prosecution cannot address the structural problems of the crimi-
nal justice system because it is an insider-led reform.153 Second, it discusses 
additional claims that under-enforcement of petty crime already exists and that 
under-enforcement is itself a detriment to local communities.154 
a. The Criminal System Requires Structural Change, Not Insider Reform 
Some scholars criticize reforms that depend on the election of progressive 
prosecutors for being incapable of producing structural change.155 Particularly, 
prosecutor-led reforms create a principal-agent problem, the exchange of op-
                                                                                                                           
 147 See Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 
686 (2018) (arguing that prosecutors use diversion programs to impose sanctions on arrestees when 
charges would have been otherwise dropped); James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Win-
dows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 33–35 (identify-
ing enforcement of quality-of-life crimes increases community stability and decreases criminal con-
duct). 
 148 See, e.g., Zack Budryk, Barr Predicts Progressive Prosecutors Will Lead to ‘More Crime, 
More Victims,’ THE HILL (Aug. 12, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/457120-barr-
predicts-progressive-prosecutors-will-lead-to-more-crime-more [https://perma.cc/2Z23-5QRZ] (quot-
ing Attorney General William Barr in a speech to the Fraternal Order of Police as saying that “anti-
law enforcement DAs . . . refusing to prosecute various theft and drug cases” will lead to “[m]ore 
crime, more victims”); Hessick, supra note 70 (arguing that broad drafting language in criminal law 
supports Rollins’ non-prosecution policy as a matter of legislative delegation).  
 149 See infra notes 155–200 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra notes 155–184 and accompanying text. 
 151 See infra notes 188–200 and accompanying text. 
 152 See infra notes 155–184 and accompanying text. 
 153 See infra notes 155–178 and accompanying text. 
 154 See infra notes 179–184 and accompanying text. 
 155 See Note, The Paradox of “Progressive Prosecution,” 132 HARV. L. REV. 748, 758–60 (2018) 
(outlining broad criticisms of reforms initiated by progressive prosecutors). 
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pressive consequences, and rely on the support of a reactive electorate.156 The 
principal-agent problem posits that if agents critical to carrying out the policy 
objective of the principal have divergent interests, those interests will inhibit 
cooperation.157 In this context, the principal is DA Rollins, while the agents are 
the line prosecutors and police officers necessary to carrying out Rollins’ non-
prosecution policy.158 Line prosecutors are the unelected prosecutors hired to 
execute the elected DA’s law enforcement policies in court.159 
Scholars argue that internal advancement practices incentivize line prose-
cutors to produce convictions, which encourages the use of enforcement dis-
cretion to box defendants into a conviction or guilty plea.160 Conversely, police 
officers are removed from the supervisory authority of the DA and carry even 
greater bargaining power than line prosecutors.161 DAs rely on police officers to 
detect and substantiate criminal activity.162 Moreover, police officers are self-
interested in avoiding penalty for their conduct in the field.163 As exemplified by 
the complaint filed against Rollins by the National Police Association, the prin-
cipal-agent problem will be a likely obstacle for a non-prosecution policy.164 
Progressive prosecutors who seek to reduce incarceration rates often use 
diversion programs as a substitute, but these programs are not without some 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Id. at 760–62 (concerning the principal-agent problem); id. at 762–65 (concerning the conse-
quences of diversion); id. at 766–68 (concerning electoral problems). 
 157 Id. at 760–65. Critical race theorists define interest divergence as the position that gains sought 
through reform are necessarily restricted when the interests of actors within the field would be harmed 
by enactment of the reform. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (defining interest convergence as the con-
dition that allows racial reforms); Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HISTORY. 1, 15 (2004) (con-
trasting interest divergence with the theory of interest convergence as defined by Derrick Bell). 
 158 See Note, supra note 155, at 761 (citing Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assess-
ment and Review, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989)) (identifying the difference in goals and risk-
tolerance among the parties in a hierarchical division of labor as the principal-agent problem). 
 159 Id. at 760–62. 
 160 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2541 (2004) (claiming that self-interest motivates line prosecutors to protect their win-loss ratio and 
professional reputation by avoiding trial losses). 
 161 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons 
of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 305, 305 (2001) (arguing that prosecutors are averse to 
challenging police officers because they rely on those officers in their cases). 
 162 Note, supra note 155, at 762 (noting that a police officer can make a decision to arrest an indi-
vidual for a crime before a prosecutor ever even gets involved). 
 163 See id. at 762–65 (noting that district attorneys only exercise persuasive authority over police 
officers, as the officers are not under their direct supervision like the line prosecutors). Although dis-
trict attorneys may exercise their prosecutorial powers against police officers, scholars argue that such 
action eliminates any persuasive authority the district attorney once had with the officers. See id. at 
764–65 (providing the example of an Albuquerque district attorney who charged two police officers 
after a civilian shooting, and consequently faced retaliatory investigation by police officers and did 
not run for reelection). 
 164 See Press Release, supra note 5 (bringing an ethics complaint against Rollins and the non-
prosecution policy). 
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level of burden to the community.165 Police assist with the organization of di-
version programs, which help to increase funding for police departments and 
entrench their institutional power.166 Some diversion programs are funded by 
the assessment of fees against arrestees, in effect offering freedom of move-
ment for a price many cannot afford.167 
Lastly, progressive prosecutors rely on their election and reelection in or-
der to enact reforms.168 The initial election of progressive prosecutors is unre-
alistic in some jurisdictions as progressive prosecutor campaigns have failed, 
even in liberal, urban jurisdictions.169 Once elected, it could be difficult for a 
progressive prosecutor to retain support from the electorate.170 Historically, the 
public reflexively responds to perceptions of increased criminal activity, 
whether accurate or not, with the election of “tough on crime” prosecutors.171 
The overarching theme of this criticism is that the criminal justice system is 
fundamentally flawed and requires systemic change, not just individual action by 
progressive prosecutors.172 The criminal legal system is systemically flawed be-
cause of the large role it plays and has played in the construction of race by dis-
tinguishing on the basis of skin color,173 creating racial hierarchies,174 and en-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Feeley, supra note 147, at 686 (arguing that prosecutors use diversion programs to impose 
sanctions on arrestees when charges would have been otherwise dropped). 
 166 See Marbre Stahly-Butts & Amna A. Akbar, Transformative Reforms of the Movement for 
Black Lives 6–9 (2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://law.rutgers.edu/sites/law/files/attachments/
Stahly%20Butts-Akbar%20-%20Transformative%20Reforms%C20of%C20the%C20Movement%
C20for%C20Black%20Lives.pdf [https://perma.cc/6A24-H87Y] (criticizing “reformist reforms” as 
contributing to the budget and role of compromised institutions such as police). 
 167 Note, supra note 155, at 766 (citing Shaila Dewan & Andrew W. Lehren, After a Crime, the 
Price of a Second Chance, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2hDrOr0 [http://perma.cc/
9LXQ-6JJU]) (describing the high economic cost of diversion programs for low-income defendants). 
 168 See id. at 766–68 (noting that the longevity of prosecutor-led reforms relies on reelection). 
 169 See id. (noting the failure of campaigns in Sacramento and San Diego). 
 170 Id. at 766–68. 
 171 Id. Scholars note the effectiveness of the “Willie Horton” campaign during the 1988 presiden-
tial election at influencing voter perception that candidate Michael Dukakis was soft on crime. Mi-
chael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the American 
Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 303 (2010). Voters are traditionally primed to vote 
for the district attorney perceived to be the most tough on crime. See Stuntz, supra note 52 at 509, 534 
(describing the historical success of the district attorney candidate with the higher conviction rate and 
sentencing record).  
 172 Note, supra note 155, at 756–58, 768–70. 
 173 See Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal 
Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1442 (2016) (outlining a critical race theory analysis of the mod-
ern criminal justice system). See generally IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CON-
STRUCTION OF RACE (2006) (submitting a critical race theory position that criminal laws and statutes 
throughout American history helped create modern understanding of racial identity). 
 174 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Afterword: Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 
1608–10 (2011) (arguing that criminal slave codes assigned an inferior social position to enslaved 
Africans). 
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forcing laws that unequally punish along racial lines.175 Prosecutors carry sub-
stantial discretion to enforce the criminal legal system and are largely protect-
ed from liability.176 Their centrality to the criminal legal system imprints pros-
ecutors with the flaws of that same system.177 Powerful actors tasked to en-
force a flawed system cannot be expected to wield their power justly, much 
less be granted additional discretionary power.178 
b. Under-Enforcement of Petty Crime Is Already a Systemic Problem 
Some critics of enforcement discretion take the exact opposite view: that 
the criminal legal system fails to sufficiently enforce criminal laws.179 These 
scholars argue that criminal laws are unequally enforced across geographic 
areas according to race and class; wealthier areas with larger white populations 
receive more enforcement while poorer areas with larger minority populations 
receive less enforcement.180 There are reports of under-enforcement of serious 
and petty crime alike.181 Under-enforcement of serious crime, such as murder 
and rape, can create “a vicious cycle” that emboldens criminals, increases ci-
vilian fear, decreases respect for police officers, and discourages cooperation 
with prosecutors.182 The under-enforcement of petty crime, such as littering 
and property defacement, is even more disparate; some experts argue that tacit 
allowance of petty crime damages the social environment of the area and en-
courages more serious criminal conduct.183 Under-enforcement of petty crime 
                                                                                                                           
 175 See, e.g., Jared Keller, A Tale of Two Drug Wars, PAC. STANDARD (Dec. 8, 2017), https://
psmag.com/social-justice/a-tale-of-two-drug-wars [https://perma.cc/AEW6-PY8H] (comparing pri-
marily retributive reactions to the crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s with the primarily rehabilita-
tive reactions to the opioid epidemic of the 2010s). 
 176 See generally Keenan, supra note 128, at 213–23 (explaining prosecutor immunity and the 
infrequency of sanctioning action by state bar agencies). 
 177 See Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 355, 372–91 (2001) (ultimately arguing that systemic forces acting on prosecutors are too 
powerful for most attorneys to overcome). 
 178 See Note, supra note 155, at 770 (urging de-construction of the criminal justice system and 
investment in low-income communities). 
 179 Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716 (2006). 
 180 See id. at 1723 (outlining research demonstrating under-enforcement of criminal law in disad-
vantaged neighborhoods (quoting Sara Stoutland, The Multiple Dimensions of Trust in Resi-
dent/Police Relations in Boston, 38 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 226, 231 (2001))). 
 181 Id. at 1724–28. 
 182 See id. at 1725 (citing Jill Leovy & Doug Smith, Mortal Wounds: Getting Away with Murder 
in South L.A.’s Killing Zone, L.A. TIMES Jan. 1, 2004, at A1) (providing an account of concentrated 
criminal activity in South Central Los Angeles and resultant neighborhood upheaval). 
 183 See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 147, at 33–35 (claiming that enforcement of quality-of-life 
crimes increases community stability and decreases criminal conduct). Although “broken windows” 
theory is sharply contested as a causal theory of criminal conduct, Natapoff claims that there is 
agreement as to the harmful effects of under-enforced petty crime on communities. See Natapoff, 
supra note 179, at 1728 n.55 (outlining academic arguments and counterarguments regarding “broken 
windows” theory). 
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can diminish property values, thereby lowering the material wealth of resi-
dents, discouraging investment, and affecting neighborhood quality of life.184 
2. Policy Support 
This Section discusses two principal grounds that provide support for the 
policy of non-prosecution.185 First, it discusses how non-prosecution allows local 
communities to claim influence over the criminalization of conduct that takes 
place in those communities.186 Second, it outlines the argument that the types of 
petty crime Rollins identifies result from public health failures, and social ser-
vices would resolve these crimes more effectively than imprisonment.187 
a. Crime Is Local, so Criminalization Should Be Local 
Scholars support non-prosecution as a democratic counterbalance to the 
disparity between the state legislature that passes criminal law and the local 
community where criminal law is enforced.188 State legislators represent local 
communities from the state at-large, while those charged with criminal viola-
tions are predominately residents of poor neighborhoods in urban areas that 
have larger minority populations.189 Rural residents, who are predominately 
white, carry disproportionately greater representation in the legislature than 
urban residents.190 The result is that white and rural populations have relatively 
greater influence in the writing of criminal law than the residents of areas most 
affected by crime.191 
Although the election of prosecutors can itself be democratically skewed 
by using county lines to provide jurisdictional boundaries as opposed to city 
boundaries or individual neighborhoods, residents of high-crime areas have 
greater opportunities for representation in local elections.192 This opportunity is 
realized through the election of progressive prosecutors with the support of 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Natapoff, supra note 179, at 1749. 
 185 See infra notes 188–200 and accompanying text. 
 186 See infra notes 188–194 and accompanying text. 
 187 See infra notes 195–200 and accompanying text. 
 188 Pfaff, supra note 14. 
 189 Id. (citing David Weisburd, The Law of Crime Concentration and the Criminology of Place, 
53 CRIMINOLOGY 133, 133–57 (2015)). 
 190 See Alan Greenblatt, Rural Areas Lose People but Not Power, GOVERNING (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-rural-areas-lose-people-not-power.html [https://perma.
cc/28PQ-LMVH] (arguing that rural legislators, despite a dwindling rural population, have been suc-
cessful at forming political blocs and capitalizing on splits among representatives of urban and subur-
ban areas). 
 191 See Pfaff, supra note 14 (arguing that the discrepancy is undemocratic). 
 192 See John F. Pfaff, Criminal Punishment and the Politics of Place, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 
580–81 (2018) (noting that voters in the suburbs are disproportionately white and higher-income). 
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voters from higher-crime urban areas.193 A non-prosecution policy from such a 
prosecutor acts as a “prosecutorial veto” against the democratic inadequacies 
of the legislative system.194 
b. Petty Crime Is a Public Health Problem 
Advocates also support non-prosecution as a means of encouraging 
treatment of public health problems with social services instead of imprison-
ment.195 Rollins’ identified crimes are associated with aggravating factors: 
homelessness, substance abuse disorder, mental illness, and poverty chief 
among them.196 Scholars argue that refusing to prosecute those crimes elimi-
nates imprisonment as an available, yet ineffective, resolution to the undesira-
ble conduct and will encourage local governments to invest in public health 
and social services.197 
Research shows that responding to such crimes with social services rather 
than imprisonment can be more fiscally effective at reducing recidivism.198 
Scholars argue that holding prosecutors accountable for the financial cost of 
their convictions would counterbalance the political incentive to appear tough 
on crime.199 Non-prosecution policies could provide a means for prosecutors to 
demonstrate recognition of the fiscal costs of imprisonment to the electorate.200 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Id.; see also Justin Miller, The New Reformer DAs, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 2, 2018), https://
prospect.org/article/new-reformer-das [https://perma.cc/SAY4-LYKB] (providing an overview of the 
recent trend in urban jurisdictions electing reform-minded district attorneys). 
 194 See Pfaff, supra note 14 (arguing that the election of reformer district attorneys negates claims 
that such policies are undemocratic). 
 195 Id. 
 196 See id. (noting that Rollins identified the proper response to the crimes as “community-based, 
no-cost programming, job training or schooling” (citing Charges to Be Declined, supra note 3)). 
 197 See id. (arguing that public health agencies have been given a “free-ride” by the criminal jus-
tice system). 
 198 Id.; see Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Labor Market Impacts of Incarceration 
(Univ. of Mich. Dep’t of Econ. and Population Studies Ctr., Working Paper, 2015) (finding that the 
deterrence factor of imprisonment does not offset the cost of imprisonment, largely due to the propen-
sity for recidivism; Jennifer L. Doleac, New Evidence That Access to Health Care Reduces Crime, 
BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/01/03/new-evidence-
that-access-to-health-care-reduces-crime/ [https://perma.cc/7CDN-ZQJD] (summarizing research 
finding that costs of providing medical care, substance abuse, and mental health treatment are out-
weighed by the reduced social costs of crime); Marie Lawrence, Locked Up or Locked Out: How Hous-
ing Insecurity Undermines Criminal Justice Reform, KENNEDY SCH. R. (Oct. 10, 2017), http://ksr.
hkspublications.org/2017/10/10/locked-up-or-locked-out-how-housing-insecurity-undermines-criminal-
justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/5Y99-2C5X] (discussing the benefits of housing services for released 
prisoners in reducing recidivism). 
 199 See Misner, supra note 63, at 719–22 (showing that prosecutors, as representatives of the 
county, bear no responsibility and face no consequences for the financial cost of their convictions, 
which primarily fall on the state penitentiary system). 
 200 See id. (advocating for a public metric between prosecutors and the cost of imprisonment to 
increase prosecutor accountability). 
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B. Effect on the Rule of Law 
Distinct from an analysis as a matter of criminal reform policy, Rollins’ 
non-prosecution policy implicates normative questions of governance.201 For 
example, one question is whether an elected official tasked with enforcing 
criminal statutes should announce a policy of presumptive non-prosecution for 
violation of those same criminal statutes.202 This Section considers the legiti-
macy of executive discretion in the prosecution of criminal law.203 It then out-
lines the institutional safeguards against arbitrary or discriminatory prosecu-
tion that can result from enforcement discretion.204 
1. Perceptions of Legitimacy 
Prosecutorial discretion is a long-standing component of executive en-
forcement in the American tradition.205 Scholars provide multiple explanations 
for the presence of prosecution discretion, chief among them the practicality of 
resource constraints and the adaptability of individualized treatment.206 Others 
suggest that discretion results naturally from dividing the creation of law and 
the enforcement of law into separate branches of government.207 
The concept of non-prosecution as an extension of discretion has received 
less attention, and for which support is less clear.208 On the one hand, Ameri-
can theories of separation of powers emerged in opposition to English monar-
                                                                                                                           
 201 See Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, 
and the Limits of Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 390–93 (2008) (providing an overview of the 
legal philosophy of non-prosecution decisions and the idea of “lawful lawlessness”). See generally 
James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1546–60 (1981) 
(evaluating the positive and negative consequences of prosecutorial discretion as a matter of govern-
ance). 
 202 See, e.g., THE ROLLINS MEMO, supra note 6 (outlining Rollins’ new non-prosecution policy 
for fifteen low-level criminal offenses and misdemeanors). 
 203 See infra notes 205–220 and accompanying text. 
 204 See infra notes 221–228 and accompanying text. 
 205 See Price, supra note 45, at 717–18 (discussing the presence of enforcement discretion in the 
early American Republic). 
 206 See id. at 743 (discussing resource allocation as a root cause of discretion); see also Roger 
Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1248–49 (2011) (discussing leniency 
as a cause for discretion so commonly accepted as to be considered “unremarkable”). 
 207 See Price, supra note 45, at 675, 701 (identifying Montesquieu and the Federalist Papers as 
early source material that support enforcement discretion as a by-product of separation of powers); see 
also MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 163 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., 1914) 
(1748) (arguing against unifying legislative and executive powers in the same authoritative body to 
reduce the potential for tyranny). 
208 See Fairfax, supra note 206, at 1246. Roger Fairfax, Jr. has written extensively on the distinc-
tion between prosecutorial discretion and categorical non-prosecution, which he refers to as “prosecu-
torial nullification.” Id. In the interest of clarity, this Note will continue to use the term non-
prosecution. 
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chical claims to power of suspending and dispensing law.209 Allowing the ex-
ecutive to use discretionary non-prosecution effectively suspends the law in the 
executive’s jurisdiction, particularly if the conduct continues to occur.210 On 
the other hand, non-prosecution is an inevitable extension of prosecutor discre-
tion that can respond to pressing societal concerns.211 
There are several doctrines that support non-prosecution within the rule of 
law, namely the existence of jury nullification, democratic accountability, del-
egation, and prosecutorial obligations, each of which merit attention.212 If a 
jury is able to nullify on the basis of their discretion, then the prosecutor 
should possess similar discretion.213 Compared with jurors, prosecutors have 
access to greater information regarding perpetrators and victims in the jurisdic-
tion and are tasked with serving the public interest.214 Local prosecutors are 
typically elected in the United States, which provides a cause of legitimacy and 
a means for enforcing accountability.215 The absence of affirmative mandates 
in criminal statutes suggests an implicit delegation of charging authority to 
prosecutors by the legislature.216 Prosecutors may also be duty-bound to cer-
tain moral obligations that increase the ethical validity of their claims to non-
prosecution discretion.217 
Disputed legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion parallels concerns that 
discretion allows for arbitrariness, which belies unfairness.218 Discretionary 
policies can produce unfair results through lack of notice that particular con-
                                                                                                                           
 209 See Price, supra note 45, at 676, 689–93 (providing an historical account of suspending and 
dispensing powers). Abolishing the ability of the English monarch to allow individual exemptions 
from laws passed by Parliament was a critical component of the 1689 English Bill of Rights and an 
“important backdrop to the American constitution enterprise.” Id. 
 210 Fairfax, supra note 206, at 1265; Price, supra note 45, at 676. 
 211 See Fairfax, supra note 206, at 1245–46, 1272–75 (describing the commonality of non-
prosecution and its potential benefits). 
 212 See id. at 1266–73 (outlining support for non-prosecution). 
 213 Id. at 1266–68. Jury nullification is “the power of the jury to disregard the judge’s instructions 
and acquit even in the face of conclusive proof of what the judge has defined as an offense.” Id. at 
1244 n.5 (quoting William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 217, 
225 (1996)). 
 214 Id. at 1266–68. 
 215 Id. at 1268–69. Some argue that the accountability provided by democratic election is weak, as 
demonstrated by high rates of reelection and lack of incumbent challengers. Id. at 1269. 
 216 See Hessick, supra note 70, at 26 (arguing that legislatures delegate discretionary powers by 
drafting overly broad criminal statutes).  
 217 See Fairfax, supra note 206, at 1272–73 (arguing that prosecutorial obligations to consistency 
and justice may support prosecutorial nullification in particular circumstances). 
 218 See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Pros-
ecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1670, 1681–82 (2010) (identifying non-prosecution decisions as a 
kind of “particularism” that, at its most extreme, could devolve into “justice without law” (quoting 
Roscoe Pound, Executive Justice, 55 AM. L. REG. 137, 144–45 (1907))). 
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duct could result in punishment, or about the level of punishment entailed.219 
Most concerning is the fact that discretion in the criminal justice system histor-
ically burdens poor and minority populations, though scholars offer multiple 
reasons for the disparity.220 
2. Institutional Safeguards 
Concerns about the impact of discretionary non-prosecution could be mit-
igated by a combination of institutional safeguards, both in theory and current-
ly in practice.221 The fundamental goal of such safeguards would be to reduce 
the ability of non-prosecution to produce arbitrary or unfair consequences.222 
Many scholars have commented on the institutional safeguards currently avail-
able to regulate enforcement discretion.223 Few, however, actively discuss the 
safeguards in the context of regulating non-prosecution.224 Scholars advocate 
that local prosecutors outline their enforcement policies in the interest of ac-
countability and trust-building with the community and constituents.225 Public-
ly available prosecutorial guidelines can also be instituted to provide clear def-
initions for discretion and increase consistency within the office of the prose-
cutor.226 Screening decisions can allow regulation of a prosecutor’s office 
                                                                                                                           
 219 See Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old 
Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2117–18 (1989) (describing the tension between clear notice of a 
legal standard and the discretion that helps serve the many interests in a pluralistic society). 
 220 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 173, at 1448–50 (tabulating use of discretionary stop and frisk 
tactics against white, black, Hispanic, and Asian populations in American cities and finding that black 
and Hispanic populations were targeted disproportionately). Compare id. at 1455 (identifying system-
ic racism as the operative reason that discretion in the criminal justice system adversely impacts Afri-
can Americans), with Bowers, supra note 218, at 1699 (identifying resource allocation as cause for the 
focus of “order maintenance” policing in poor and minority communities). 
 221 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Discretion Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 959, 963–64 (2009) (outlining various internal and external institutional tools available 
to encourage fair prosecutorial discretion). 
 222 See Massaro, supra note 219 at 2117–18 (describing due process concerns in the absence of 
clear notice of a legal standard). 
 223 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 888–93, 895 (2009) (advocating that various safeguards 
exercised in administrative enforcement be adopted in the criminal prosecutor context); Bibas, supra 
note 221, at 965–1015 (detailing various internal and external institutional tools available to encour-
age fair prosecutorial discretion); Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in 
New Jersey, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1087, 1093–97 (2005) (tracking New Jersey court requirements 
for stricter prosecutorial guidelines). 
 224 But see Fairfax, supra note 208, at 1275–80 (identifying mechanisms that could specifically 
regulate non-prosecution policies). 
 225 See Misner, supra note 63, at 776–77 (arguing that such a strategy would empower voters to 
compare the strategies of competing prosecutor candidates). 
 226 Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strate-
gies, 109 PENN. ST. L. R. 1155, 1176 (2005) (arguing that if the “real law is made by prosecutors,” 
and prosecutors have a right to not enforce, then the public should be aware of the extent of that right). 
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through management of implicit biases.227 Adversely, other scholars argue that 
institutional safeguards are insufficient to adequately prevent the dangers of 
discretion.228 
III. ANTICIPATING THE MERITS OF LEGAL CHALLENGES AND POLICY 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ROLLINS’ NON-PROSECUTION POLICY 
Rollins’ non-prosecution policy allows for analysis through a varied spec-
trum of legal disciplines, ranging from constitutional law to legal ethics to crit-
ical race theory.229 Section A of this part addresses the merits of a legal chal-
lenge on the three identified grounds of separation of powers, victims’ rights, 
and ethics rules.230 Section B then examines the applicability of the normative 
policy arguments to the non-prosecution policy outlined by Rollins.231 
A. Merits of a Legal Challenge 
The viability of a legal challenge against Rollins’ non-prosecution policy 
is unlikely on the basis that not a single previously-identified ground for ille-
gality is independently sufficient within the case law of Massachusetts.232 Un-
derlying this proposition is the high degree of discretion permitted to local 
prosecutors and the concern that a judicial body itself could violate separation 
of powers by overruling an executive policy.233 The combined effect, however, 
of multiple legal concerns could allow a court to utilize a catch-all provision to 
find the policy a violation of a prosecutor’s ethical duty.234 
                                                                                                                           
 227 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 
55 (2002) (identifying internal rules and policies as valuable tools for regulation of discretion). 
 228 See Bowers, supra note 218, at 1660 (outlining institutional reasons, such as legalistic thinking 
and conviction rate maintenance, that prosecutors lack the capacity to effectively wield discretion). 
 229 See Butler, supra note 173, at 1442, 1461–62 (responding to prosecutorial reforms with criti-
cal race theory analysis); Massaro, supra note 219, at 2117–18 (describing the ethical tension between 
clear notice of a legal standard and the discretion that helps serve the many interests in a pluralistic 
society); Price, supra note 45 at 678–79 (positing a framework for enforcement discretion). 
 230 See infra notes 232–256 and accompanying text. 
 231 See infra notes 257–278 and accompanying text. 
 232 See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 725–
29 (2001) (outlining that the inapplicability of many rules of professional conduct to prosecutors and 
the special nature of their position as some of the reasons why it is rare for prosecutors to face disci-
plinary action); see also THE ROLLINS MEMO, supra note 6 (describing Rollins’ non-prosecution 
policy for fifteen low-level criminal offenses and misdemeanors). 
 233 See Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 84 N.E.3d 13, 22 (Mass. 2017) (finding that a judge’s decision 
“not to sentence a defendant pursuant to statutes that were properly charged and convicted was er-
ror”); Commonwealth v. Cheney, 800 N.E.2d 309, 314–15 (Mass. 2003) (finding a judge’s restriction 
of prosecutorial discretion to be constitutionally invalid under Article XXX). 
 234 See Green, supra note 135, at 1578 (identifying Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) as 
a provision used against general abuses of prosecutorial discretion); see, e.g., Iowa Supreme Court 
Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Barry, 762 N.W.2d 129, 141 (Iowa 2009) (suspending prosecutor under Rule 
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Rollins’ non-prosecution policy is likely valid under Article XXX of the 
Massachusetts State Constitution, current Massachusetts statute, and binding 
precedent as within the confines of prosecutorial discretion.235 The Supreme 
Court provides a constitutional threshold for bringing a criminal charge, but it 
has not created an affirmative requirement.236 Similarly, by statute, Massachu-
setts explicitly provides for discretionary charging on the basis of the prosecu-
tor’s opinion of the public interest.237 Massachusetts courts have not applied 
Article XXX to restrict a prosecutor’s discretion in any case.238 To the contra-
ry, the courts use Article XXX to restrict judicial override of prosecutorial dis-
cretion.239 While other executive actions have been deemed unconstitutional 
under Article XXX, these actions involved failure to follow an affirmative in-
struction from the legislature.240 If the criminal statutes were amended to in-
clude affirmative charging requirements, non-prosecution would violate sepa-
ration of powers.241 Alternatively, the Massachusetts SJC could turn to less-
yielding separation of powers doctrine, more common in cases of non-criminal 
executive enforcement discretion, as persuasive support for finding a viola-
tion.242 
                                                                                                                           
8.4(d), as adopted in the Iowa Rules of Professional Responsibility, for accepting quid pro quo contri-
butions to a sheriff’s fund in exchange for non-prosecution of the contributor). 
 235 MASS. CONST. art. XXX; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 15 (2018); see Commonwealth v. 
Pellegrini, 608 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Mass. 1993) (holding that a judicial order of pre-trial dismissal of a 
case over the prosecutor’s objection was impermissible under Article XXX); Manning v. Mun. Court 
of the Roxbury Dist., 361 N.E.2d 1274, 1276 (Mass. 1977) (holding that the prosecutor carries discre-
tion to discontinue prosecution without approval of another official). 
 236 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1996) (requiring a prosecutor to pos-
sess probable cause to bring a criminal charge). 
 237 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 10. 
 238 But see Curley v. City of Lynn, 556 N.E.2d 96, 98 (Mass. 1990) (finding that a state executive 
agency, the Civil Service Commission, cannot effectively modify statutory provisions regarding the 
filing of petitions). 
 239 Cheney, 800 N.E.2d at 314–15 (finding that the procedure for judge-issued continuance of a 
case, without first obtaining a guilty plea or a verdict, and over the objection of the prosecutor, consti-
tuted a constitutionally invalid exercise of executive powers under Article XXX). 
 240 See, e.g., Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1221–23 (Mass. 1978) (finding 
that failure to use appropriated funds for policy reasons as opposed to avoiding waste violated Article 
XXX). 
 241 See Price, supra note 45, at 715 (noting the constitutionality of affirmative designs for crimi-
nal statutes); Hessick, supra note 70, at 26 (arguing that legislatures delegate discretionary powers by 
drafting overly broad criminal statutes).  
 242 See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1160–62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam) 
(upholding the district court order that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare commence 
enforcement proceedings against schools found to be noncompliant with Title VI); Op. of the Justices, 
376 N.E.2d at 1221 (finding that although the executive branch has discretion to avoid wasteful ex-
penditures, refusal to issue appropriated funds that accomplish disliked objectives would violate Arti-
cle XXX). 
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There is Massachusetts precedent that supports judicial oversight of pros-
ecutorial discretion without violating Article XXX.243 The case of Attorney 
General v. Pelletier allows for the removal of prosecutors on the grounds of 
dereliction of duty, including failure to prosecute.244 Although this case re-
mains good law in Massachusetts, it is unlikely that modern courts would uti-
lize Pelletier absent showing that the non-prosecution at issue was rooted in 
public corruption.245 A recent single-justice opinion of the SJC, however, 
demonstrates the difficulty of successful judicial contestation of the non-
prosecution policy in light of Article XXX.246 
This recent separation of powers determination demonstrated the potential 
weakness of at least one Massachusetts Victim Bill of Rights argument.247 A 
similar challenge to Rollins’ non-prosecution policy on the basis of the Massa-
chusetts Victim Bill of Rights would require victims of non-prosecuted offens-
es to file private criminal complaints.248 At that point, the prosecutor would be 
obligated to provide a minimum amount of information to the victim.249 Com-
                                                                                                                           
 243 See Att’y Gen. v. Pelletier, 134 N.E. 407, 437–38 (Mass. 1922) (allowing for judicial removal 
of a public prosecutor in Massachusetts on the basis of charges including corruption and non-
prosecution of chargeable offenses without violating separation of powers). 
 244 See id. at 434, 437. 
 245 See Green & Levine, supra note 98 at 173–75 (identifying the late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century as a period where non-prosecution was a commonplace indicator of corrup-
tion, particularly in refusing to prosecute vice charges or for protecting individuals). 
 246 See Commonwealth v. Webber, No. SJ-2019-0366, 2019 WL 4263308, at *1 (Mass. 2019) 
(holding that a judge’s refusal to grant a nolle prosequi requested by the prosecutor violates Article 
XXX of the Massachusetts Constitution). Following arrests made against counter-protesters at a 
“Straight Pride Parade,” Rollins’ office entered nolle prosequi in the cases of persons charged with 
disorderly conduct. Id. at *2. Boston Municipal Court Judge Richard Sinnott refused to accept the 
nolle prosequi, finding that the non-prosecution violated the rights of “Straight Pride Parade” march-
ers under the Massachusetts Victim Bill of Rights. Id. In a single-justice opinion, Associate Justice 
Frank Gaziano of the Massachusetts SJC held that entry of nolle prosequi is a constitutional right of 
the Commonwealth and cannot be denied by a judge without violating Article XXX. Id. at *1 (citing 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 16; Cheney, 800 N.E.2d at 314–15). 
 247 See id. at *2 (refusing to accept the trial judge’s position that the right of the victim to confer 
with the prosecutor prior to entry of nolle prosequi allows the denial of a non-prosecution decision); 
see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(g) (granting victims the permissive right to confer with the 
prosecutor before the commencement of trial and entry of a nolle prosequi). Although Associate Jus-
tice Gaziano held that the public-at-large, not the individual protesters, were the “victims” of a disor-
derly conduct violation, the plain language of § 3(g) confers a permissive right to victims and express-
ly precludes victims’ authority “to direct prosecution of the case.” Webber, 2019 WL 4263308 at *2; 
see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(g). 
 248 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 4(b) (granting right to a private person to apply for issuance of pro-
cess); Victory Distribs., Inc. v. Ayer Div. of the Dist. Court Dep’t, 755 N.E.2d 273, 277 (Mass. 2001) 
(finding that private right to the criminal complaint process is limited to filing an application and court 
action on that application). 
 249 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3(a) (requiring the prosecutor to inform victims of their 
“rights in the criminal process”); id. § 3(d) (requiring victim to be informed of available protection); 
id. § 3(e) (requiring victim to be informed of financial assistance and social services); id. § 3(h) (re-
quiring victim to be informed of the right to request confidentiality). 
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munity response to the non-prosecution policy could include organized filing 
of private criminal complaints.250 More substantial rights that provide for input 
from the victim are only available if the prosecutor decides to proceed.251 
Common law restitution is similarly available at the discretion of the prosecu-
tor and prosecutors have been disciplined for allowing too much influence to 
the victim in determining the restitution sought in plea negotiations.252 
A challenge on the basis of violation of ethics rules is also likely to fail.253 
Model Rule 3.8(a) is the only enforceable provision that directly relates to the 
charging decision, and it mirrors threshold constitutional requirements instead 
of setting affirmative charging requirements.254 The most viable basis for legal 
challenge to the non-prosecution policy is use of a catch-all provision of the 
enforceable ethics rules.255 In this scenario, the court could use the general 
language of Rule 8.4(d) as a means for disposing of a policy that raises varied 
concerns about over-extension of prosecutorial discretion, the interest of vic-
tims in receiving restitution, as well as the legitimate imperative of a prosecu-
tor to enforce the law.256 
B. Normative Assessment of Non-prosecution Policy 
Arguments critical of progressive prosecutors focus on the proposition 
that insider reforms fail to resolve the structural problems of the criminal jus-
tice system.257 Their most meritorious criticism is the principal-agent problem, 
particularly involving relationships with police officers, as the ethics complaint 
                                                                                                                           
 250 See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 4(b) (granting right to a private person to apply for issuance of pro-
cess). 
 251 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258B, § 3 (outlining the express obligations owed to victims by 
prosecutors during criminal proceedings). 
 252 See Rodrigues, supra note 120, at 213 (describing the state’s control over prosecution and the 
criminal justice system’s focus on punishment rather than compensation); see, e.g., In re Flatt-Moore, 
959 N.E.2d 241, 245–46 (Ind. 2012) (holding that its sanction of a prosecutor for permitting too much 
influence in setting the amount of requested restitution did not violate separation of powers doctrine). 
 253 See Zacharias, supra note 232, at 725 (describing the “rarity of discipline” of prosecutors). 
 254 Compare MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (2016) (imposing a probable cause re-
quirement and using the operative verb “refrain” instead of an affirmative charging requirement), with 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463–64 (requiring a prosecutor to possess probable cause to bring a criminal 
charge). 
 255 See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (concerning conduct prejudicial to admin-
istration of justice). The “prejudice to justice” rule is a catch-all provision that authorities can invoke 
against abuses of prosecutorial discretion that involve gross misconduct. See, e.g., Barry, 762 N.W.2d 
at 129 (suspending prosecutor for quid pro quo contributions to a sheriff’s fund in exchange for non-
prosecution). 
 256 See MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (concerning conduct prejudicial to admin-
istration of justice). 
 257 See Note, supra note 155, at 756–58, 768–70 (arguing that internal reforms by progressive 
prosecutors are fundamentally incapable of adequately changing a corrupted criminal justice system); 
Stahly-Butts & Akbar, supra note 166, at 5–9 (criticizing “reformist reforms” as contributing to the 
budget and role of compromised institutions such as police). 
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filed by the National Police Association already bears out.258 Building relation-
ships with police will be a critical endeavor for the DA, and the use of diver-
sionary programs as an alternative to incarceration may provide a satisfactory 
metric for police departments.259 The least meritorious are claims that diver-
sion programs are overly burdensome and that prosecutorial reforms rely on 
democratic election.260 These criticisms fail to identify alternative consequenc-
es for violating laws passed by a legislative majority, doubt the ability of vot-
ers to gauge the success of elected prosecutors, and generally dismiss demo-
cratic values.261 
Critics who focus on the neighborhood impact of under-enforcing petty 
crime raise arguments against non-prosecution that garner merit.262 The exist-
ence of quality-of-life crime in a neighborhood certainly diminishes property 
values, which undeniably affects the stability and investment of local resi-
dents.263 The crux of applying under-enforcement concerns to non-prosecution 
policy is whether policing of quality of life crimes will diminish as a result of 
prosecutors utilizing diversionary programs instead of criminal prosecution.264 
Supporters of non-prosecution persuasively argue that the election of 
prosecutors allows democratic values to extend to the enforcement of criminal 
law.265 This argument logically extends from the current precedent and consti-
tutionality of broad prosecutorial discretion held by a locally elected prosecu-
                                                                                                                           
 258 See Press Release, supra note 5 (filing an ethics complaint against Rollins). See generally 
Eisenhardt, supra note 158, at 58 (identifying the difference in goals and risk-tolerance among the 
parties in a hierarchical division of labor as the principal-agent problem). 
 259 See Pettaway, supra note 5 (addressing local community and police reactions to the policy 
announcement). The availability of officers to focus on more serious crime may also increase job 
satisfaction for officers over time. See Rich Morin et al., Behind the Badge, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 11, 
2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/01/11/behind-the-badge/ [https://perma.cc/9ZQZ-QUN4] 
(surveying police officer job satisfaction and correlating satisfaction with holding the trust of the 
community). 
 260 See Note, supra note 155, at 764–68 (describing diversion programs as reinforcing the institu-
tional power of police and voters as predisposed against electing progressive prosecutors). 
 261 See Henderson, supra note 107, at 944–50 (outlining legislative acts resulting from the vic-
tim’s rights movement); see also Pfaff, supra note 14 (arguing that policies instituted by locally elect-
ed prosecutors more proximately reflect the interests of local communities); Weigel, supra note 2 
(identifying a trend of jurisdictions across the country electing progressive prosecutors). 
 262 See Natapoff, supra note 179, at 1724–28 (arguing that criminal law enforcement is dispropor-
tionately reduced in low-income and minority neighborhoods); see also Stoutland, supra note 180 at 
231–32 (outlining research demonstrating under-enforcement of criminal law in disadvantaged neigh-
borhoods). 
 263 Natapoff, supra note 179, at 1749. 
 264 See Quincy Walters, Rachael Rollins, New Suffolk DA, Wants to Work with Police for Equita-
ble Justice, WBUR NEWS (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/news/2019/01/03/rollins-suffolk-da-
work-with-police-equitable-justice [https://perma.cc/RA2F-KJBR] (quoting Boston Police Commis-
sioner William Gross on the non-prosecution policy) (“One of the key things we talked about is that 
the community still deserves justice if crimes are committed.”). 
 265 See Pfaff, supra note 14 (arguing that policies instituted by locally elected prosecutors more 
proximately reflect the interests of local communities). 
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tor.266 The position that legislatures create statutes in a manner different than 
that desired by local communities is merely a gloss on the conclusion that 
broad discretion held by locally elected prosecutors allows for voters to influ-
ence the manner of enforcement.267 Should the legislature disapprove of non-
prosecution policies, they hold the authority to revise criminal statutes to in-
clude affirmative charging requirements.268 
Supporters of public health solutions as a substitute for incarceration for 
petty crimes raise points that are compelling, yet impractical.269 The costs of 
incarceration are clearly high, both in terms of logistical cost and the cost to 
families and communities, relative to the costs of public health solutions.270 
Rollins’ non-prosecution policy and supporters of public health solutions both 
lack a strategy for coordinating increases in public health resources to assume 
the burden currently carried by the incarceration system.271 Any substantial 
period between the start of non-prosecution and distribution of increased pub-
lic health resources would result in a political crisis for Rollins.272 
The greatest vulnerability of Rollins’ non-prosecution policy is the poten-
tial for overwhelming demand on public health resources combined with pub-
lic perception that the policy constitutes an erosion of the rule of law.273 If the 
policy overburdens the public health infrastructure in place, then public sup-
port will erode, exposing the non-prosecution policy to greater legal vulnera-
                                                                                                                           
 266 See Hessick, supra note 71, at 26 (arguing that legislatures delegate discretionary powers by 
drafting overly broad criminal statutes); see also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463–64 (creating a minimum 
evidentiary threshold rather than an affirmative charging requirement); Shepard v. Att’y Gen., 567 
N.E.2d 187, 190 (Mass. 1991) (holding that a prosecutor that held an inquest into a death does not 
have a duty to bring a case). 
 267 Compare Miller, supra note 193 (providing an overview of the recent trend in urban jurisdic-
tions electing reform-minded district attorneys), with Greenblatt, supra note 190 (noting that predom-
inately white, rural jurisdictions have retained outsized political control of legislatures). 
 268 See Price, supra note 45, at 715 (describing the constitutionality of affirmative enforcement 
conditions of criminal statutes). 
 269 See Pfaff, supra note 14 (arguing that petty crimes arise from public health failures). 
 270 See Doleac, supra note 198 (finding that costs of providing medical care, substance abuse, and 
mental health treatment are outweighed by the reduced social costs of crime). 
 271 See Pettaway, supra note 5 (reporting that Rollins claims the onus will rest on public health 
officials to rise to the demand when the District Attorney’s office initiates the non-prosecution poli-
cy). 
 272 See Budryk, supra note 148 (quoting Attorney General William Barr as forecasting that non-
prosecution policies will lead to “[m]ore crime, more victims”); Pfaff, supra note 14 (noting the multi-
faceted issues, such as homelessness, drug addiction, and mental health problems, currently handled 
by the criminal justice system); Stuntz, supra note 52 at 509, 534 (describing the historical success of 
the district attorney candidate with the higher conviction rate and sentencing record). 
 273 See Pfaff, supra note 14 (noting that the criminal justice system carries the burden of public 
health failures). Compare Price, supra note 45, at 676, 689–93 (providing a historical account of the 
unfairness associated with executive suspending and dispensing powers), with Fairfax, supra note 206 
at 1245–46, 1272–75 (describing the commonality of prosecutorial non-prosecution and its potential 
benefits).  
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bility as an unacceptable rule of law violation.274 If the policy’s public health 
consequences are less severe, then the DA’s office will be able to promote the 
policy as responsive to public welfare and democratic accountability, the two 
strongest sources of support under the rule of law.275 
Rollins’ office should use institutional safeguards to more effectively im-
plement non-prosecution policy.276 Adoption and publication of prosecution 
guidelines, as illustrated by the Rollins Memo, should reduce claims of arbi-
trariness and unfairness in the circumstances where the office chooses to pros-
ecute.277 Additionally, screening processes would reduce the potential harm of 
the principal-agent problem, at least among line prosecutors.278 
CONCLUSION 
Rollins’ non-prosecution policy is constitutionally sound, but courts have 
access to supportable legal challenges if the policy unsettles public perception 
of the rule of law. A successful legal challenge is most likely in the event that 
non-prosecution leads to a substantial gap between public health resources and 
general quality-of-life expectations. Absent such a public health failure, the 
non-prosecution policy will be protected by the powers that separation of pow-
ers doctrine has granted to the DA. Judicial and ethical challenges to the non-
prosecution policy demonstrate this protection. The policy, however, remains a 
bold and novel measure lacking coordinated planning with public health offi-
cials and local police departments. Although institutional safeguards can assist 
with implementation of the policy and improve internal compliance, opposi-
tion from institutions critical to the criminal justice system would cripple the 
policy. If under-enforcement of quality-of-life crime currently exists in low-
                                                                                                                           
 274 See Fairfax, supra note 206 at 1272–73 (arguing that prosecutorial obligations to consistency 
and justice may support prosecutorial nullification in particular circumstances). 
 275 See id. at 1268–69 (citing Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability 
Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1589 (2010)) (describing the legitimacy of 
policies enacted by local officials who are held accountable to an electorate); Pfaff, supra note 14 
(arguing that policies instituted by locally elected prosecutors more proximately reflect the interests of 
local communities). 
 276 See Barkow, supra note 223, at 888–93 (advocating that various discretionary decisions be 
made by different prosecutors); Bibas, supra note 221, at 965–1015 (detailing various internal and 
external institutional tools available to encourage fair prosecutorial discretion); Wright, supra note 
223 at 1093–97 (tracking New Jersey court requirements for stricter prosecutorial guidelines). 
 277 See Misner, supra note 63, at 767–69 (arguing that transparent publication of prosecutorial 
policies would empower voters to compare the strategies of competing prosecutor candidates); see 
also Dripps, supra note 226, at 1176 (“People have a right to know the law, and if the real law is made 
by prosecutors, then people have a right to know which criminal statutes the legislature has authorized 
prosecutors to nullify.”). 
 278 See Wright & Miller, supra note 227, at 55 (identifying internal rules and policies as valuable 
tools for regulation of discretion); see also Bibas, supra note 160, at 2541 (claiming that self-interest 
motivates line prosecutors to protect their win-loss ratio and professional reputation by avoiding trial 
losses). 
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income and minority neighborhoods, Rollins’ policy may exacerbate difficul-
ties of daily life in disadvantaged communities. 
Because the DA’s claim to prosecutorial discretion arises from interest in 
the public welfare, substantial public opposition to the policy can provide le-
gitimacy to legal challenges based on ethics rules. Furthermore, there is still 
good law on the Massachusetts books for removing a prosecutor on the 
grounds of non-prosecution, which provides an additional basis for legal chal-
lenge. While removal or sanctioning of prosecutors for invoking prosecutorial 
discretion is out of step with current legal doctrine, there is precedent that sup-
ports judicial response to institutional failure. 
JOHN E. FOSTER 
